

PRESIDENT GEORGE H. W. BUSH AND GENERAL MERRILL A. MCPEAK: AN  
INVESTIGATION OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TWO NATIONAL  
SECURITY LEADERS, VIS-À-VIS LEADERSHIP STYLES, AS EXPRESSED  
DURING THE GENESIS OF THE UNIPOLAR MOMENT


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
DISSERTATION  
Presented to the Faculty of the  
Department of Business and Leadership  
Our Lady of the Lake University  
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
In  
Leadership Studies


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
Mark T. Green, PhD  
Committee Chair



Malcolm Ree, PhD  
Committee Member



Diana Garza-Ortiz, PhD  
Committee Member



Mr. Steven Wise, MA, MLIS  
Graduate Faculty Representative

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## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

During his final three years of doctoral studies, Colonel John W. Blumentritt served as Director of Safety, Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas. He led mishap prevention programs for more than 88,000 personnel charged to recruit, train and educate over 340,000 people annually via Air Force Recruiting Service, Air University, two numbered air forces, and about 1,500 aircraft.

Colonel Blumentritt received his commission in 1983 via the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps at Angelo State University, Texas. After earning his pilot wings, he flew many rescue and special operations missions as a helicopter pilot worldwide.

Colonel Blumentritt also served as a strategist in the Pentagon and commanded an education squadron at the United States Air Force Academy. Later, he orchestrated four-star-general speech preparations and legislative positions as director of the action group for the commander of Air Education and Training Command. Upon transfer to the 19th Air Force Headquarters, as the chief of safety, he began the doctoral program at Our Lady of the Lake University in San Antonio, Texas in January, 2006.

Prior to pursuing doctoral studies, Colonel Blumentritt retained a Bachelor of Science degree from Angelo State University, a Master of Science degree from Michigan State University, a Master of Arts degree from the Naval War College, and two advanced degrees from Air University. These two degrees from Air University include a Master of Airpower Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies and a Master of Strategic Studies degree from the Air War College.

## DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my family. These superstars encouraged me to enter into doctoral studies and provided support and encouragement along the way.

My wife Darlene, whose patience is never-ending, was always there for me. Our son Christopher and daughter Sonja, who pursued their college experiences concurrently with my doctoral journey, enjoyed sharing the academic spotlight with their father.

Finally, our daughter Ashley transitioned into her high school career during this scholarly period, and as such, her eagerness for learning bolstered my own optimism.

The genesis of the unipolar moment affected all my family members. Our three children were born between 1987 and 1993. Amid this tumultuous period, the family endured a husband and father, who responded to regional conflicts, coped with slashed defense budgets, dodged the draconian release of career military members, and persevered during reorganization efforts.

A piece of the demolished Berlin Wall has nested in the Blumentritt study for years. As such, events associated with that small but noteworthy symbol drove many family moves and assignments. It is hoped this dissertation will complement that tiny chunk of rock and perhaps answer questions Christopher, Sonja, and Ashley may have someday as they reflect back on childhoods that were molded by the genesis of the unipolar moment.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I must thank President George H. W. Bush and General Merrill A. McPeak for their service to the nation. I met President Bush and sons George W. and Jeb in 1993 while in Kuwait, and attended a lecture delivered by General McPeak while attending Air War College in 2003. Without a doubt, these extraordinary gentlemen possessed and leveraged great talent during the genesis of the unipolar moment.

Second, I must thank Colonel Thomas A. Drohan, Permanent Professor and Head, Department of Military Strategic Studies, United States Air Force Academy. While serving under his command in 2002, he prompted me to speak at a conference sponsored by the Royal Australian Air Force in Canberra, Australia. The conference theme was *Conflict, the State and Aerospace Power: New Perspectives for the Third Millennium* and the topic to be addressed was *The Unipolar Moment: A View from the Top of the Ziggurat*. Colonel Drohan provided superb guidance during conference preparations, which spurred my interest in the unipolar moment and this dissertation seven years later.

Third, Dr. Mark T. Green provided outstanding mentorship and boundless encouragement as my dissertation committee chairperson. A simple thank you for support provided during four-years of doctoral studies and dissertation compilation seems a bit insignificant. However, it is delivered with the utmost in sincerity and gratitude.

Finally, I appreciate the efforts of my dissertation committee to include Dr. Malcolm Ree and Dr. Diana Garza-Ortiz. These two professionals combined pragmatic advice with nurturing patience, which in turn bolstered the quality of this product.

## ABSTRACT

This study examines the leadership styles of President George H. W. Bush and United States Air Force General Merrill A. McPeak. The period of interest is at the conclusion of the Cold War, which has been described as the genesis of the unipolar moment (Krauthammer, 1990/91). The primary topics President Bush and General McPeak addressed during this period involved fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns. Transactional and transformational leadership language was empirically measured via the use of content analysis research techniques. Consequently, a significant difference was found in percentages of both transactional and transformational leadership language as a result of speaker and topic. In addition, a significant relationship between the communication event delivery date and the use of transformational leadership language by President Bush was also found. However, no other relationships between communication delivery date and either leader were found significant.

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## CHAPTER ONE: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

### Introduction

This dissertation examines the leadership styles of President George Herbert Walker (H. W.) Bush, the forty-first president of the United States, and the fourteenth chief of staff of the United States Air Force, General Merrill A. McPeak. The primary area of interest is transactional and transformational leadership language expressed while addressing key topics from their leadership positions at the conclusion of the Cold War.

This tumultuous period, from 1989 to the early 1990s, is described as the genesis of the unipolar moment (Krauthammer, 1990/91). It was marked by Soviet Union disintegration and the emergence of the United States as a lone superpower. Key topics that existed during this period, of which Bush and McPeak addressed, include fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns.

As is the case with leaders who retain colorful or bland legacies, history may be derived from stories not supported by facts (Daft, 2005). As such, information garnered from this study provides empirical contributions to any perceived legacies Bush and McPeak may retain from their unipolar experience.

Leadership language was empirically measured via the use of content analysis research techniques. Findings were then applied to transformational leadership theory as put forward by Burns (1978) and the full-range leadership model as championed by Bass (1985), and then refined by Bass and Avolio (1994) and Avolio in 1999.

### Background

As the Soviet Union disintegrated from 1989 to 1991, leaving the United States as the only existing superpower, a near-50-year-old bipolar world geopolitically transformed



into a unipolar setting (Krauthammer, 1990/91). During the genesis of this event, Krauthammer predicted that multipolarity would eventually emerge as Japan, China, Germany, and the European community gained power. However, for the *moment*, the United States nested at the top of the world's ziggurat (Blumentritt, 2002).

Twelve years later, Krauthammer (2002/03, p. 5) looked back at this genesis period and stated, "The gap in power between the leading nation and all the others was so unprecedented as to yield an international structure unique to modern history." As such, Krauthammer noted that leaders charged with national security had to address slashed defense budgets, unprecedented challenges of regional conflicts, and reorganization efforts to meet challenges. In addition, other unique concerns generated opportunities to practice leadership during this chaotic time.

Bush and McPeak served as national security leaders during the genesis of the unipolar moment. Both men addressed economic challenges as well as multiple regional conflicts. Bush's organizational changes centered on influencing domestic and international players in a post-Cold War environment while McPeak "reinvented the Air Force" (McPeak, 1995, p. 309).

#### *Genesis of the Bipolar World*

Kennedy (1989) put forward that a difficult challenge for British and French decision makers in the 1930s was to predict the eventual role of the United States and the Soviet Union. Both were giant, unpredictable, and somewhat detached from the global strategic arena. Yet decision makers knew they would be important in future balance of power issues. Regarding the entry of the United States into World War II, Kennedy said,

“*de Tocqueville’s* forecast of 1835, concerning the emergence of a bipolar world, was at last on the point of being realized” (p. 343).

Even as World War II was raging, American military planners realized a bipolar world consisting of the United States and the Soviet Union would emerge after the defeat of Japan (Kennedy, 1989). When this occurred in 1945, an Allied victory became the genesis of the Cold War (Millett & Maslowski, 1994). Consequently, a bipolar era marked by rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union lasted for the next 50-years (Kennedy, 1989). Subsequent conflicts in places such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Vietnam, exacerbated by the participation of the superpowers or their proxies, were part of this competition (Lieber, 1997).

#### *Genesis of the Unipolar Moment*

In 1989, the erosion of Soviet power in the Baltic republics, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Romania, and Czechoslovakia preceded the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union (Millett & Maslowski, 1994). From 1989 to 1991, the Berlin Wall came down and the Warsaw Pact dissolved. By the end of 1991, “the Soviet Union had passed into the dustbin of history, replaced by a Commonwealth of Independent States” (Millett & Maslowski, 1994, p. 629). Finally, as 1992 began, it was clear “the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and the Russian Federation had become an independent country” (Huntington, 1997, p. 19).

Much conventional thought at the time suggested the bipolar world would simply transform into a multipolar world, whereby Japan, China, Germany, and the European community would emerge as power balancers against the United States (Krauthammer, 1990/91). This state of affairs did not occur at the onset, but believing the unipolarity of

the United States was transitory, Krauthammer described this geopolitical condition as a moment that could range from 10 to 40 years.

### *Challenges of the Unipolar Moment*

The genesis of the unipolar moment was tumultuous. Krauthammer (1990/91, p. 23) put forward, “Ever since it became clear that an exhausted Soviet Union was calling off the Cold War, the quest [was] on for a new American role in the world.” However, Millett and Maslowski (1994, p. 628) wrote, “Like deer in the headlights of an oncoming car, the Bush administration, much of Congress, and the American armed forces found themselves barely able to respond to the rush of events that marked the end of the Cold War.” Finally, Khalilzad (1997, p. 151) charged that the United States was “squandering a-once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to shape the future of the world because it [did not have] a broadly agreed upon [post Cold War] vision and strategy.” As such, the rush of events Khalilzad believed the United States failed to address included fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns.

### *Fiscal Challenges during the Unipolar Moment*

Lieber (1997) mentions that in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, hope and assumptions led people to believe there would be a reduction in international conflict. Defense plans were subsequently reviewed, and in 1990, “Congress ordered a 13 percent reduction in defense spending over the next five years” (Millett & Maslowski, 1994, p. 629). The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded with plans to slash spending and reduce forces as much as one third. Krauthammer (1990/91, p. 26) put forward that, “administration plans [had] U.S. defense spending on a trajectory down to four percent by 1995, [which was] the lowest since Pearl Harbor.”

The United States Air Force, as well as other services, “found these reductions unimaginable” (Millett & Maslowski, 1994, p. 629). In 1993, McPeak (1995) stated the Air Force budget had dropped 44 percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, the number of active duty members was down a third, and the combat fighter force was half what it had been in 1988. Finally, the draconian release of career officers and noncommissioned officers, coupled with the fiscally-generated prospect of ending quality recruitment, was troubling for all the services (Millett & Maslowski, 1994).

### *Regional Conflicts during the Unipolar Moment*

Regional conflicts quickly substituted for world peace after the demise of the Soviet Union. However, conflicts in various regions were no longer “Cold War-Hot War” scenarios in support of bipolar strategies between the United States and the Soviet Union (Millett & Maslowski, 1994, p. 494). Instead, a number of post-colonial nations of the Third World, infuriated with accumulated grievances and unconstrained by previously coercive and concerned superpowers, menaced each other via interstate war, civil war, terrorism, drug movement, exploitation, extortion, and “nasty weapons” (p. 648).

For example, 1989 witnessed chaos in Lebanon, a popular uprising in China, continuance of death squads in El Salvador, and an insurgency in the Philippines (Millett & Maslowski, 1994). In addition, de facto dictator Manuel Noriega of Panama generated an extreme case of regional instability in Latin America. Consequently, Bush ordered Operation Just Cause in December, 1989, in which military forces brought about the overthrow and arrest of Noriega (Bush, 1999).

Probably the most well-known regional conflict of the unipolar moment is the 1991 Gulf War, which Iraq set into motion by invading Kuwait and threatening Saudi

Arabian oil fields (Powell, 1995). The invasion generated a massive mobilization of United States military forces in defense of Saudi Arabia, known as Operation Desert Shield, and an offensive campaign known as Operation Desert Storm (Powell, 1995).

“Manual Noriega of Panama and Saddam Hussein of Iraq made the case that the United States still required combat-ready armed forces of wide capabilities” (Millett & Maslowski, 1994, p. 630). In addition, rogue states and transnational terrorists, with a budding capability to employ weapons of mass destruction, began to emerge and further complicate the international environment (Krauthammer, 1990/91).

#### *Organizational Changes during the Unipolar Moment*

Some in the domestic and international community deemed powerful defense spending and large organizational structures, designed to address Cold War challenges, unsuitable for the unipolar moment (Millett & Maslowski, 1994). Millett and Maslowski point out that in 1989, the Democrat majority in the United States Congress and some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies balked at costly organizational aspects of the national security environment. This in turn led to a demand for reductions and further dependence on the United Nations.

McPeak (1995, p. 269) stated in 1993, “One of the biggest puzzles facing service senior leadership [in those days was] how to maintain capability despite shrinking resources.” To address this challenge, he orchestrated sweeping Air Force organizational changes. To the Air Force Association’s National Symposium, on October 24, 1991, McPeak championed, “Make no mistake, these are the most significant organizational changes made since we became a separate service in 1947” (p. 61). On September 14th, 1994, McPeak addressed the Air Force Association’s National Convention in Washington

D.C., and in a speech entitled, “Reinventing the Air Force,” he laid out the massive changes made since his 1991 presentation (p. 309-317).

### *National Security Leadership and Legacies*

Bush began his presidency in January 1989 and was “immediately plunged into [this] maelstrom of crisis” (Millett & Maslowski, 1994, p. 628). At the same time, McPeak was serving as a United States Air Force four-star general and in command of Pacific Air Forces (Hopper, 1997). However, the firing of General Michael Dugan, the thirteenth chief of staff of the United States Air Force, by Secretary of Defense Dick Chaney in October 1990 resulted in McPeak joining the Bush national security leadership team as the fourteenth chief of staff of the United States Air Force (Voorst, 1990).

Regarding legacies, the literature is filled with qualitative and quantitative studies, opinion pieces, modern-day comments from pundits, and even blogs regarding presidents and senior military officers. Information is prolific, mixed, and much of it is negative. Collectively, the information combines to form legacies.

### *Common Bush Legacy from the Unipolar Moment*

Bush “followed in his predecessor’s footsteps from a tactical standpoint yet never gained the reputation for being as effective a communicator as [President Ronald] Reagan (Sparks, 2001, p. 38). Moreover, “Bush ... never enjoyed political combat and found the experience unpleasant and bewildering” (Graubard, 2004, p. 494). Following a botched debate during the Republican primaries on February 23, 1988, Loeb (as cited in Parmet, 1997, p. 229) opined that Bush looked “like a small boy who had been dropped off at the wrong birthday party.” Finally, Duesterberg (2001, p. 62) supposes that “Bush did not make history but was likely a victim of it.”

According to Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young in 1988 (as cited in Rubenzer & Faschingbauer, 2004), Bush served as the forty-first president of the United States with “decency and fairness” (p. 201). However, he was defeated for reelection by William Jefferson “Bill” Clinton in 1992, retired from public service, and is generally defined by the successful prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War and the reversal of his famous “read my lips, no new taxes” pledge (Sparks, 2001, p. 38). As such, Rubenzer and Faschingbauer label Bush a “maintainer” (p. 203) president and suggest his kind but lackluster legacy compares to those of Presidents Calvin Coolidge and Warren G. Harding.

Consequently, and certainly with exception, many modern day references to Bush tend to be benign and polite. Moreover, an unpretentious legacy seems to emit from places like the George Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas and the George Bush Gallery at the National Museum of the Pacific War in Fredericksburg, Texas. Finally, road signs in West Texas proudly publicize Midland, Texas, which is one of Bush’s adopted hometowns (George W. Bush Childhood Home).

#### *Common McPeak Legacy from the Unipolar Moment*

As for the McPeak legacy, Hopper (1997, p. 41) put forward that, “McPeak was not a charismatic leader. His leadership style and blunt communication methods hurt him in getting lasting change implemented.” For example, McPeak poured tremendous amounts of energy into an ill advised uniform design, of which successor General Ronald R. Fogleman “ditched within a week of his taking office” (Grier, 2009, p. 63).

McPeak retired in November, 1994 and is frequently defined by distracters such as his radical uniform design, projection of a condescending stance toward non-pilots, and a heritage program described as resented and insensitive (Hopper, 1997, p. 30-31).

Even before McPeak's retirement, Crawford of the RAND Corporation (as reported by Bird in *Air Force Times* in 1993 and cited in Hopper, 1997, p. 31) stated, "The new uniform was a stupid, minutia thing. With the big-time stuff such as cutting people and planes going on, to fool around with the uniform sort of trivialized his time." Moreover, Bird (as cited in Hopper, 1997, p. 35) elaborated that McPeak was "without charisma, stoical, eccentric, cold, and aloof."

McPeak dabbled in politics after retirement. He supported Republican George W. Bush, the son of George H. W. Bush, during his 2000 presidential campaign (Esteve, 2008). However, he switched parties and supported Democrats Howard Dean, John Kerry, and then became an advisor to Barack Obama during his 2008 bid for the presidency. Verbal gaffes committed by McPeak during the Obama campaign, such as comparing Hillary Clinton and her patriotism to the 1950s communist-hunter Joseph McCarthy, added to his legacy. Reflecting on this political blunder, the subsequent redirection by Obama aids on brusqueness, and his self-professed shortcomings, McPeak said, "I'm blunt, and bluntness is not the name of the game in politics" (Esteve, 2008).

Albeit colorful, and contributory to end-state legacies, this study was not conducted with a concern toward modern day viewpoints spurred by political partisanship. What is fruitful for legacy consideration, in conjunction with leadership and the genesis of the unipolar moment, are contemporary comments in the form of recollections by people who served with McPeak from 1989 until his retirement in 1994.

Opportunities to post memories by these people, mostly via political websites, seem to have proliferated as McPeak returned to the public view. For example, and while shrouded in the safety of anonymity, Internet postings to the Esteve article (2008) include



contemptible and emotional comments, comparable to similar forums with McPeak as the subject, which are still remembered and published two-decades after his tenure. Although unempirical, these comments suggest a less than well-liked legacy continues.

#### Statement of the Problem

In circa 400-320 B.C. Chinese General Sun Tzu championed, “War is a grave concern of the state; it must be thoroughly studied” (Sun Tzu, 400-320 B.C./1963, p. 39). Consequently, it is imperative the leadership styles practiced during the genesis of the unipolar moment by national security officials, amid fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns be thoroughly and scientifically assessed. In fact, there are four distinct reasons why ignorance of this knowledge presents an unsatisfactory condition and why this problem must be studied.

#### *Fallacy of Reification Problem*

First, Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) warn the fallacy of reification is likely to be committed if concepts, such as the presidency, the office of the chief of staff of the United States Air Force, or any other abstract concepts are regarded, not as symbols of phenomena, but instead as the phenomena themselves. For example, “speaking or writing about the concept of ‘the presidency’ as if the term itself has drives, needs, or instincts, is an error despite the tendency to do so” (p. 25).

This potential for ignorance is germane because the leadership styles of Bush and McPeak, versus opinions that fill the literature, media, and Internet are benchmarks that must populate national security and leadership literature. To illustrate, it was Bush the leader, and not simply the office of the presidency, who on August 6, 1990 championed to the world, “This will not stand; this aggression against Kuwait” (Powell, 1995, p. 467).

*Leadership as a Mainstay to Political Objectives*

Second, and in line with the fallacy of reification problem, is the role of human leadership. In fact leadership, a mainstay in the attainment of political objectives via war for centuries, can be defined as a “process whereby an individual influences a group to achieve a common goal” (Northouse, 2004, p. 3). Thucydides cited influential speeches given by Athenian and Spartan generals to rally troops before battles during the 431-403 B.C. Peloponnesian War (Strassler, 1996). In addition, Sun Tzu championed, “He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious” (Sun Tzu, 400-320 B.C./1963, p. 83).

While Northouse (2004), Thucydides (Strassler, 1996), and Sun Tzu (400-320 B.C./1963) focused on leaders influencing followers, Reynolds (1995) reverses this concept in the context of surgically removing leader influence from enemy followers. Reynolds describes a Gulf War attack strategy against Iraq, derived by United States Air Force Colonel John A. Warden III, which was based on the premise that, “every action in war should be geared to affecting the enemy’s leadership” ( p. 17). Instead of fighting through fielded forces to terminate enemy leaders, Warden advocated the use of Airpower to isolate Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders at the same time enemy forces were to be targeted. Consequently, enemy leaders were prevented from influencing their combatant followers (Hallion, 1992).

Historians may find pleasure in understanding post-conflict political objective and methods of attainment. However, students of national security and leadership are remiss if they do not understand human influences that led followers to pursue agreed upon political end states during periods of war and non-war, such as those practiced during the genesis of the unipolar moment.

*Resilience of the Unipolar Moment*

Resilience is the third reason why unipolar-centric ignorance is unsatisfactory. Specifically, in 2002/03, Krauthammer looked back at his 1990/91 comments regarding the genesis of the unipolar moment and suggested the moment could be here to stay. In fact, Krauthammer (2002/03) and Blumentritt (2002) suggest the unipolar moment might perpetuate as a unipolar era if the United States remains willing to forcibly defend its persistent nesting at the top of the world's ziggurat.

This resilient stance requires national security leaders to understand that war is not simply violent behavior among savages fueled by hate, but “a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means” (Clausewitz, n. d. /1984, p. 87). As such, unipolar-ignorance is a problem for leaders charged to perpetuate its resilience because failing to understand leadership styles during the genesis risks the failure to understand the nature of future unipolar-centric confrontations. Clausewitz wrote:

The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature (p. 88).

*Voluntary Abstention from Global Hegemony*

The fourth and final reason why unipolar-centric ignorance is unsatisfactory involves national self-denigration. Specifically, it is plausible the United States will be governed by leaders who wish to voluntarily abstain from global hegemony and accelerate multipolarity over unipolarity. These leaders could influence followers to

willingly transfer power to multilateral institutions in an effort to spread risk by allowing a global body to act as “*primus inter pares*...sharing rule-making functions with others” (Krauthammer, 1990/91, p. 15).

Regardless of opinion on the merits or drawbacks of this position, one must reflect back upon the fallacy of reification (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). As such, it has not been “the United States” that perpetuated the unipolar moment, but instead leaders, both nationally and internationally, who influenced followers to sustain unrivaled American dominance (Krauthammer, 1990/91). Future national security leaders charged to embrace and execute a dominating unipolar position, or resist and provide alternative advice, would be intellectually ill served by failing to understand how predecessors practiced leadership and influenced followers during the genesis of the unipolar moment. Moreover, responsible citizens should understand unipolar-centric positions as championed by elected representatives and appointed officials.

#### Purpose of the Study

While there is a wealth of unipolar-centric literature contained in the academic literature of security and strategic studies, history, and political science, there is a void in the discussion of this phenomenon in leadership literature. Consequently, a potential exists for opinion-based leadership legacies to populate the literature, wrongheaded assumptions about leaders to abound, and conclusions to be garnered via rhetoric versus research. Regarding Bush and McPeak, this absence could promote unsubstantiated colorful or bland legacies at best. At worst, leadership development programs could develop based on faulty analysis and considerations.

In contrast, this study provides an empirically valid contribution to Bush and McPeak legacies. Specifically, this content analysis-centric study leverages a non-probability sample design using convenience and purposive samples garnered unobtrusively via archival records (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). Leadership styles, as practiced by and during the tenure of Bush and McPeak, are measured in accordance language expressed amid transformational leadership theory as put forward by Burns (1978) and the full-range leadership model as championed by Bass (1985), and then refined by Bass and Avolio (1994) and Avolio in 1999.

This content analysis research study, specifically focused on Bush, McPeak plus transactional and transformational leadership language generated during the genesis of the unipolar moment, joins appropriate history and social science literature to fulfill Sun Tzu's recommendation for thorough analysis of war (Sun Tzu, 400-320 B.C./1963). Moreover, this study provides knowledge to leaders charged to stymie externally aggravated unipolar-centric confrontations. Finally, this study will prepare leaders and citizens to intellectually understand, and then embrace or resist, potential efforts to self-denigrate United States hegemony via the proactive termination of the unipolar moment.

#### Assumptions

Holsti put forward in 1968 (as cited in Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000) that content analysis is "any technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specific characteristics of messages" (p. 296). Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias build upon this definition and suggest that objectivity should be guaranteed by way of rules that enable follow on researchers to obtain similar results. As

such, research assumptions must be part of this quest for objectivity, and thus, the “basic assumptions of science” (p. 5) provide a useful tool.

First, nature embraces regularity and order (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). As such, words and word-phrases expressed or legacies earned do not just occur, but instead match patterns that can be understood. This study was conducted under the assumption that patterns exist amid language expressed by Bush and McPeak.

Second, “individuals and social phenomena exhibit sufficient recurrent, orderly, and empirically demonstrated patterns to be amenable to scientific investigation” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000, p. 5), and as such, “we can know nature.” This study was conducted under the assumption that, via a disciplined and scientific method, the communication events selected for analysis are representative and valid for leadership style assessment.

Third, this study was conducted under the assumption that while staff members and speechwriters conduct research and mechanically assemble words and word-phrases to be delivered by senior leaders, the “tone, subject matter, content, and style” are still controlled by the person delivering the message (Duesterberg, 2001, p. 5). As such, it is assumed that despite assistance provided to Bush and McPeak, their words and word-phrases made public and selected for this study, display “patterns amenable to scientific investigation” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000, p. 5).

Fourth, Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) reject supernatural, spiritualism, religion, and magic as causal or related to phenomena. This scientific study embraces this position and was conducted under the assumption that all phenomena discovered and inferences made are related to natural causes. Moreover, personal

opinions, emotionalism, political partisanship, and views on divine grace, punishment, and reward are assumed to be absent from this study.

A fifth assumption complements the idea that “knowledge is not acquired only through the perceptions transmitted by the five senses” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000, p. 6). Indeed, while this study was conducted under an embracement of empiricism, it is assumed that quantitatively assessed leadership styles can contribute to legacies derived from other means. Without a doubt, reasonable people may disagree on Bush and McPeak legacies, but when a quantitative piece bolsters knowledge, subjective views become more empirical and lessons of leadership become more constructive.

Next, this study was conducted under the assumption that transactional and transformational leadership concepts can be measured via content analysis, and that this technique retains the same validity and reliability as measurement tools, such as the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ), promoted by Bass (1985) and refined by Bass and Avolio (1994) and Avolio in 1999. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000, p. 6) put forward that “knowledge is based on experience [but] many phenomena cannot be experienced or observed directly.” Whereas some researchers use surveys and other techniques to mitigate these phenomena, this study used content analysis techniques.

Finally, this study was conducted under the assumption that “knowledge is superior to ignorance” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000, p. 6). Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias put forward that “True believers already ‘know’ all there is to know [and] scientific knowledge challenges dogma, stability, and the status quo” (p. 6). Consequently, it is assumed this quantitative contribution will assist efforts to not only

abate dogmatic ignorance, but provide an opportunity to prepare national security leaders and citizens alike to embrace quality decision making in regard to unipolar-centric topics.

In summary, this study was conducted under the following seven assumptions.

1. Patterns exist amid language expressed by Bush and McPeak.
2. Communication events selected for analysis are representative and valid for leadership style assessment.
3. Despite staff and speechwriter assistance, words and word-phrases made public by Bush and McPeak reflect patterns and are representative and valid for leadership style assessment.
4. This study embraces the idea that natural phenomena are related to natural causes and is absent personal opinions, emotionalism, political partisanship, and views on divine grace, punishment, and reward.
5. Quantitative contributions to legacies generated from any source bolster knowledge, promote valuable empiricism, and support constructive lessons of leadership.
6. Transactional and transformational leadership style can be measured via content analysis, and this technique retains the same validity and reliability as other measurement instruments such as the MLQ.
7. Opportunities exist for a quantitative contribution to replace dogmatic ignorance and improve the human condition.

#### Conceptual Definitions

Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) put forward that conceptual definitions are “definitions that describe concepts by using other concepts” (p. 26). These definitions



“serve as symbols that permit communication [and] point out the unique elements or qualities of the item defined” (p. 27). For example, the term Cold War cannot be sensed empirically, and standing alone, may mean countless things to various people. However, the term can be conceived through the “intellectual process of abstraction” (p. 27) using primitive terms such as colors and derived terms such as groups.

From a pragmatic standpoint, the task of listing every primitive and derived term that encompasses concepts, such as the Cold War, versus simply using the agreed upon term to evoke shared meaning, would be laborious and unworkable. For example, it is easy to grasp that the fall of the Berlin Wall, during the Bush presidency in 1989, affected the Cold War (Millett & Maslowski, 1994). In contrast, it would be quite complex if each variable affected by that event, such as changes in the geostrategic environment, impacts to the global economy, and responses by alliances and pacts had to be individually included in the discussion.

Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) note that it is crucial to remember that conceptual definitions are “neither true nor false [but instead] symbols that permit communication... Put simply, the definition is what the definer says it is” (p. 27). As such, this study includes 13 conceptual definitions.

The first conceptual definition to be addressed is the term *Cold War*. In this study, the Cold War refers to an ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, plus countries that formed behind one or the other as opposing blocks. The Cold War began at the conclusion of World War II and lasted until the disintegration of the Soviet Union around 1989 to 1991 (Millett & Maslowski, 1994).

Second, the term *Unipolar Moment* refers to the post-Cold War condition after the Soviet Union disintegrated, which left the United States as the only remaining superpower until other states could emerge and fill the void (Krauthammer, 1990/91).

Third, this study employs the term *Fiscal Challenges* to address post-Cold War economic conditions in which defense spending and the United States Air Force budget were considerably slashed (McPeak, 1995).

The fourth conceptual definition to be addressed is the term *Regional Conflicts*. In a speech delivered to the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 1991, Bush described regional conflicts as post-Cold War security challenges in which “suspended hatreds” held captive by communism, in the form of “ancient disputes, ethnic rivalries, nationalist aspirations, and old prejudices, sprung to life” (George Bush Presidential Library and Museum - Public Papers). From Millett and Maslowski (1994), regional conflicts refer to post-Cold War conditions by which a number of post-colonial nations of the Third World, infuriated with accumulated grievances and unconstrained by previously coercive and concerned superpowers, menaced each other via interstate war, civil war, terrorism, drug movement, exploitation, extortion, and “nasty weapons” (p. 648). Consequently, all of these perspectives are considered in the conceptual definition and employment of the term regional conflicts.

Fifth, the term *Organizational Changes* refers to efforts by Bush and McPeak to effectively transform Cold War organizations to meet new security challenges within modest unipolar budgets. Bush’s organizational changes centered on influencing domestic and international players in a post-Cold War environment while McPeak “reinvented the Air Force” (McPeak, 1995, p. 309).

The sixth conceptual definition to be addressed is the term *President of the United States*. Except when specifically noted, such as particular references to other people occupying the office of the presidency, this term is synonymous with Bush. In addition, this concept is not interchangeable with the term presidency of the United States, which is commonly understood by the public, and defined and governed by the United States constitution and law. This distinction mitigates the potential for the fallacy of reification (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).

The seventh conceptual definition is the term *chief of staff of the United States Air Force*. Except when specifically noted, such as particular references to other people occupying the top United States Air Force position, this term is synonymous with McPeak. Also, this concept is not interchangeable with the term chief of staff of the Air Force, as defined and governed by U.S. Code: *Title 10, Chapter 805, Section 8033, Chief of Staff*, January 2000 (as cited in Bussiere, 2001, p. 54-55). This distinction mitigates the potential for the fallacy of reification (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).

*Legacy* is the eighth conceptual definition in this study. Guralnik (1978, p. 806) defines legacy as “anything handed down from, or as from, an ancestor.” Legend is defined as the stories told about the exploits of a “notable person whose deeds or exploits are much talked about in [their] own time” (p. 806). Daft (2007, p. 365) states that legends “are historic and may have been embellished with fictional details.” Consequently, all of these perspectives are considered in the conceptual definition and employment of the term legacy.

*Management* is the ninth conceptual definition in this study. Quite different from leadership, this study considers management as, “the attainment of organizational goals

in an effective and efficient manner through planning, organizing, staffing, directing, and controlling organizational resources” (Daft, 2005, p. 16).

The 10th conceptual definition is the term *Leadership*. Daft (2005) penned that “scholars and other writers have offered more than 350 definitions of the term leadership. However, for this study, the term leadership refers to a “process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal” (Northouse, 2004, p. 3).

*Transactional leadership* is the 11th conceptual definition this study employs. This form of “leadership occurs when one person takes the initiative in making contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of valued things” (Burns, 1978, p. 19). In accordance with the full range leadership model as championed by Bass (1985) and refined by Bass and Avolio (1994) and Avolio in 1999, factors associated with transactional leadership include contingent reward and management-by-exception in active and passive forms (Northouse, 2004, p. 179).

*Transformational leadership* is the 12th conceptual definition to be addressed. Originally named transforming leadership (Burns, 1978), but later renamed transformational leadership (Bass, 1985), this form of “leadership occurs when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality” (Burns, 1978, p. 20).” In accordance with the full range leadership model as championed by Bass (1985) and refined by Bass and Avolio (1994) and Avolio in 1999, factors associated with transformational leadership include idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration (Northouse, 2004).

Finally, *Laissez-faire* behavior is the 13th conceptual definition in this study. Akin to the French phrase, this term reflects a “hands off--let things ride approach” (Northouse, 2004, p. 179) and is considered “the absence of leadership” (p. 179).

In summary, this study was conducted using the following 13 conceptual definitions:

1. *Cold War*: An ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, plus countries who formed behind one or the other as opposing blocks. The Cold War began at the conclusion of World War II and lasted until the disintegration of the Soviet Union around 1989 to 1991 (Millett & Maslowski, 1994).
2. *Unipolar Moment*: Post-Cold War condition after the Soviet Union disintegrated, which left the United States as the only remaining superpower until other states could emerge and fill the void left by the Soviet Union (Krauthammer, 1990/91).
3. *Fiscal Challenges*: Post-Cold War economic conditions in which defense spending and the United States Air Force budget were considerably slashed (McPeak, 1995).
4. *Regional Conflicts*: Post-Cold War security challenges in which post-colonial nations of the Third World, who had been held captive by communism and infuriated with accumulated grievances, menaced each other through various forms of violence (Millett & Maslowski, 1994).

5. *Organizational Changes*: Efforts by Bush and McPeak to effectively transform Cold War organizations to meet new security challenges within modest unipolar budgets.
6. *President of the United States*: Synonymous with Bush. This concept is not interchangeable with the term presidency of the United States, which is commonly understood by the public and governed by the United States constitution and law.
7. *Chief of staff of the United States Air Force*: Synonymous with McPeak. This concept is not interchangeable with any term associated with the top United States Air Force position, which is governed by U.S. Code: *Title 10, Chapter 805, Section 8033, Chief of Staff*, January 2000 (as cited in Bussiere, 2001, p. 54-55).
8. *Legacy*: Historic stories, susceptible to embellishment, about a notable person whose deeds or exploits are either talked about or handed down (Guralnik, 1978, Daft, 2007).
9. *Management*: “The attainment of organizational goals in an effective and efficient manner through planning, organizing, staffing, directing, and controlling organizational resources” (Daft, 2005, p. 16).
10. *Leadership*: “Process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal” (Northouse, 2004, p. 3).
11. *Transactional Leadership*: “Process by which one person makes contact with another for the purpose of exchanging items of value” (Burns, 1978, p. 19).

12. *Transformational Leadership*: “Process by which an individual engages with others and creates a connection that raises the level of motivation and morality in both the leader and the follower” (Burns, 1978, p. 20).
13. *Laissez-faire* behavior: “The absence of leadership” (Northouse, 2004, p. 179).

### Research Questions

Two primary research questions were crafted to ascertain if there is any significant difference in the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language, expressed by Bush and McPeak during the genesis of the unipolar moment, as a result of speaker and topic. These questions focused on the leadership style of interest, which is transactional and transformational leadership, as put forward by Burns (1978) and the full-range leadership model as championed by Bass (1985), and then refined by Bass and Avolio (1994) and Avolio in 1999.

The two primary research questions that were addressed are as follows:

1. Is there a significant difference in percentages of transactional leadership language as a result of speaker and topic?
2. Is there a significant difference in percentages of transformational leadership language as a result of speaker and topic?

During the course of this study, a suspicion arose that a significant relationship might exist between the timing of communication event delivery and the use of transactional or transformational leadership language. To address this issue, four additional research questions were crafted to assess the relationship between the timing of

communication event delivery and the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language expressed by Bush and McPeak.

The four secondary research questions that were addressed are as follows:

1. Is there a significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transactional leadership language by Bush?
2. Is there a significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transformational leadership language by Bush?
3. Is there a significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transactional leadership language by McPeak?
4. Is there a significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transformational leadership language by McPeak?



## CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

### Overview

The purpose of this literature review is to put forward information that augments the empirical research associated with this study. Specifically, information mined from the literature supports areas of interest as guided by dependent variables, independent variables, and opportunities for contributions to leadership legacies.

The primary area of interest in this study is transactional and transformational leadership language, expressed by President Bush and General McPeak, while addressing key topics during the genesis of the unipolar moment. The dependent variables in this study are the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language expressed, while the primary independent variables are speakers and topics. A secondary independent variable is associated with timing of communication delivery.

Regarding the dependent variables, this literature review supports the primary area of interest by putting forward foundational information on the evolution of leadership theory with an emphasis on transactional and transformational leadership. In addition, the practice of measuring leadership is investigated via the review of a meta-analysis associated with 45 (N = 45) transformational leadership theory-centric studies.

Key topics Bush and McPeak discussed while serving in their leadership positions, represented as four independent variables in this study, were affected by events that existed during the period of interest. As such, the leadership language used in addressing these topics was developed over a lifetime of experience. Consequently, this literature review provides support to the primary area of interest and independent variables via tailored biographies of Bush and McPeak that reflect this experience.

In fact, tailored biographies on Bush and McPeak are presented that not only describe the paths and preparations these men undertook on their journeys to pinnacle leadership positions, but are also assembled in a way that complements discussions on leadership theory. For example, personality issues are included where applicable, ages during actions are calculated and presented periodically, and situations each leader experienced, with an emphasis on the Cold War, fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, and organizational changes, are integrated. Finally, variables suggestive of an early propensity toward transactional or transformational leadership are included.

Finally, this literature review supports and enhances opportunities to complement legacies Bush and McPeak may retain from their leadership experiences. Indeed, knowing the path and preparations they took, in the context of leadership theory, bolsters legitimacy in the consideration and discussion of legacies.

#### Foundations of Leadership

The primary focus of this study, in which this literature review augments, is to ascertain if there is any significant difference in the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language, expressed by Bush and McPeak during the genesis of the unipolar moment, as a result of speaker and topic. As such, transformational leadership theory, as put forward by Burns (1978) and the full-range leadership model as championed by Bass (1985), and then refined by Bass and Avolio (1994) and Avolio in 1999, is of primary interest.

However, Burns (1978) charged that, “Leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth” (p. 2). In addition, Fleishman et al. (as cited in Northouse, 2004, p. 2) put forward that over the last 50-years, “there have been as many

as 65 different classification systems developed to define the dimensions of leadership.” Finally, Bennis in 1958 (as cited in Van Seters & Field, 1990, p. 29) stated, “Of all the hazy and confounding areas in social psychology, leadership theory undoubtedly contends for the top nomination.”

Transformational leadership theory was born from early leadership theorists (Van Seters & Field, 1990). As such, a comprehensive discussion on the evolution of leadership theory is germane to this study and quite valuable.

### *Born not Made*

Johnson (2009) puts forward that “until the 1940s, researchers believed that leaders were born, not made, [and that] only people who inherited the necessary mental and physical characteristics or traits could be leaders” (p. 167). Some examples of traits believed to be possessed by great people, such as Abraham Lincoln and Napoleon, include “intelligence, self-confidence, determination, integrity, and sociability” (Northouse, 2004, p. 19). Personality is also considered in terms of traits that can affect leadership, with Dingman in 1990, Barrick and Mount in 1993, and Wiggins and Pincus in 1992 (as cited in Daft, 2005, p. 125) purporting the Big Five personality dimensions. Four of these personality traits include extroversion, conscientiousness openness to experience, and agreeableness. The fifth trait, emotional stability, is also studied under the term neuroticism (Rubenzer & Faschingbauer, 2004).

Carlyle is “among the most famous of the born-leadership theorists” (Duesterberg, 2001, p. 10). In 1902, Carlyle (as cited in Wren, 1995, p. 54) wrote, “Find in any country the Ablest Man that exists there; raise him to the supreme place, and loyally reverence him: you have a perfect government for that country...”

Albeit “intuitively appealing [with] a century of research to back it up” (Northouse, 2004, p. 15), Stogdill in 1948 (as cited in Northouse, p. 15) “suggested no consistent set of traits differentiated leaders from non-leaders across a variety of situations.” Regardless, Northouse cites Bryman, who in 1992 claimed there was “resurgence in interest in the trait approach [to explain] how traits influence leadership” (p. 16). Validating this claim, popular leadership instruments robustly exist, such as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, Leadership Trait Questionnaire (LTQ) (p. 30-31), and the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) (Rubenzer & Faschingbauer, 2004).

### *Power and Influence*

As it became recognized that leadership is “not a characteristic of solitary leaders [but instead] a relationship between individuals” (Van Seters & Field, 1990, p. 29), the influence era emerged with French in 1956 and French and Raven in 1959 (as cited in Van Seters & Field, 1990) establishing the power relations period. As such, five types of power aimed toward influencing behavior were proposed.

Daft (2005) describes these five types of power, with the first being legitimate power. This power is the authority granted from a formal position in an organization. The second type is reward power, which stems from the authority to bestow financial or physical compensation on others. The third type is expert power, which comes from a leader’s special knowledge or skills as viewed by subordinates. The fourth type, referent power, generates admiration and prompts followers to emulate the leader. The fifth type is coercive power, which is the power to punish or recommend punishment. It is manifested by the privilege to discharge, demote, and criticize. It is also regarded as the “negative side of legitimate or reward power” (Daft, 2005, p. 481).

Pfeffer in 1981 (as cited in Van Seters & Field, 1990, p. 32) put forward that “power influence is certainly prevalent in today’s leaders.” However, a number of leadership experts deem coercive power as problematic. In fact, as early as 1959, French (as cited in Van Seters & Field, 1990, p. 32) stated the “dictatorial, authoritarian and controlling nature of this type of leadership is no longer considered effective.” Northouse (2004), using Adolph Hitler of World War II and Jim Jones of the 1978 Guyana massacre as examples, argues that using power and restraint to force followers to engage in behavior runs counter to working with followers to embrace a common goal, and as such, does not equate to the practice of legitimate leadership. Burns (1978) criticizes leaders who use coercive power and labels them power-wielders. He states that, “naked power-wielding can be neither transactional nor transforming” (p. 20).

Bass (1985) elaborates:

The coercive, bullying, stemwinding, browbeating, aggressive, combative leader may obtain remarkable transformations in the amount of energy followers are willing to expend for him, particularly in the short run and particularly if he had gained control over the necessary resources, and is inventive, manipulative, exploitative, and politically astute (p. 74).

Finally, Burns (1978) unmistakably champions, “Power wielders may treat people as things. Leaders may not.” (p. 20).

### *Behavior in Style*

The behavior era “took a completely new direction by emphasizing what leaders do, as opposed to their traits or source of power” (Van Seters & Field, 1990, p. 32). The style approach, which is a component of the behavior era, emphasizes the behavior of the

leader (Northouse, 2004). Efforts at Ohio State University in 1957 by Hemphill and Coons, University of Michigan in 1960 by Cartwright and Zander, and Blake and Mouton's with their managerial leadership grid in 1964 (as cited in Northouse, 2004) are all works that are categorized under the style approach.

Although each research pursuit conducted under the style approach expresses a certain attribute of uniqueness, they "typically [distinguish] between two approaches to leadership" (Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, & van Engen, 2003, p. 570). The first approach, described as task-oriented, is generally associated with "accomplishing assigned tasks by organizing task related activities" (p. 570). The second approach, described as interpersonally-oriented, commonly links to "maintaining interpersonal relationships by tending to others' morale and welfare" (p. 570).

#### *History's Slaves*

During the situation era, researchers acknowledged that factors beyond the leader and subordinate are important in the practice of leadership. In 1943, Hook (as cited in Van Seters & Field, 1990) purported this right place-right time argument, and suggested people serving as leaders are inconsequential because if they leave, someone else will take over. Moreover, this idea was bolstered upon the realization that a group tends to function amid mutually confirmed expectations (Van Seters & Field, 1990).

This line of thought is the antithesis of the great man theories. In fact, Duesterberg (2001, p. 10) champions that if "Thomas Carlyle is the classic advocate of the 'great-person' theory of leadership, [then] Leo Tolstoy is an exemplary promoter of the opposing viewpoint." Tolstoy (as cited in Wren, 1995, p. 59) charged that "the so-called great men are labels giving names to events, and like labels they have but the smallest

connection with the event itself.” Indeed, Tolstoy clearly championed in 1933 that man is an unconscious instrument that exists amid the predestination and inevitability of history, and thus, a king who so happens to affect a great number of lives is still simply a tool like any other man, and hence, a slave for history’s purpose.

Duesterberg (2001) conducted a content analysis-centric study amid 49 speeches (N = 49) Bush delivered from January, 1989 to December, 1992 and their relationship to standings in the Gallup Poll. A significant, positive correlation was found between transformational and transactional words and word-phrases ( $r = 0.508$ ) ( $p < .05$ ) as “both sets of words decreased or increased in frequency at roughly the same time” (p. 41).

The outcomes of the study prompted Duesterberg to acknowledge Tolstoy postulations. Specifically, Duesterberg put forward “that leaders were not born but were merely at the right place at the right time in history.” (p. 64). He then concluded that “Bush did not make history but was likely a victim of it.” (p. 64).

#### *Behavior is Contingent on Situations*

In time it was recognized that leadership cannot be constrained to pure or one-dimensional forms (Van Seters & Field, 1990). Johnson (2009, p. 168) suggests that “leaders [have] to adapt to elements of the situation, such as the nature of the task, the emotional, motivational, and skill levels of the followers, and the quality of the leader-follower relationship.” Upon the realization that behavior is contingent on situations, the contingency era was born and a “flood of contingency theories occurred” (Van Seters & Field, 1990, p. 35).

The literature is untidy regarding the contingency era, as researchers and authors tend to use the terms contingency and situational interchangeably when describing related

theories. In fact, one of the most widely recognized approaches from this era, developed by Hersey and Blanchard in 1969, is named the situational approach (Northouse, 2004). Another theory in this group that Fiedler put forward in 1964, and refined in 1967, is called the contingency theory. Finally, Van Seters and Field (1990) champion the Path-Goal theory, which Evans, House, and Mitchell developed from 1970-1974, as a noteworthy product of the contingency era.

### *In-Groups and Out-Groups*

Early logic suggested that quality leadership was something leaders provided to all their followers (Northouse, 2004). However, it was realized that role differentiation and social interaction prompts leaders to have different relationships, and thus different transactions, among different subordinates (Van Seters & Field, 1990). This complexity gave birth to the transactional era, and as such, reasoning as to why followers in an in-group are treated differently than those in an out-group.

A number of researchers addressed this complexity. One such study, known as the leader-member exchange (LMX) theory, was put forward by Dansereau, Graen, and Haga, from 1975 to 1976 (as cited in Northouse, 2004). This theory focuses on the dyadic relationship between leaders and followers, and suggests the path to an in-group or out-group is determined in three phases. Specifically, dynamics that occur during a stranger phase, acquaintance phase, and then a mature partnership phase, result in established roles in an organization. Subordinates who fall into an out-group may be treated fairly but accomplish their contractual job and little more. In-group members earn more time and support from leaders, and in exchange, tend to accomplish more than is required and champion innovation (Northouse, 2004).



### *Servant Leadership*

Distinguished institutions showed their fragility, and crumbled in the midst of campus turmoil, during the 1960s and early 1970s (Greenleaf, 1977). Amid this chaos, Greenleaf championed that, “we live in the age of the anti-leader” (p. 4). Fueled by hope, he emerged from retirement and established servant-leader theory. Van Seters and Field (1990) label the period that Greenleaf influenced as the anti-leadership era.

Greenleaf (1977) advocates that people who occupy leadership roles should view themselves as servants to those they lead and followers should only be responsive to servant leaders. From Northouse (2004, p. 309), “Servant leadership emphasizes that leaders should be attentive to the concerns of their followers and empathize with them [sic] They should take care of them and nurture them.” Hunter (2004) champions this theory and lauds Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., Nelson Mandela, and Mother Teresa as examples of servant leaders.

### *Culture and Leadership Omnipotence*

Despite the efforts of Greenleaf (1977), cynicism during the anti-leadership era propelled the idea that leadership might not be a “phenomenon of the individual, the dyad, or even the small group” (Van Seters & Field, 1990, p. 37). Instead, it was suggested that leadership is an omnipotent force imbedded in the culture of an organization. Assumptions were made that passive leadership, or even the absence of leadership, is fine once a desired culture is established or changed. (Van Seters & Field, 1990). In turn, culture-centric logic suggests that members of a culture will lead themselves and the next generation of leaders will be products of the established culture.

From Smircih in 1983, Brown and Starkey in 1994, and Duncan in 1989 (as cited in Daft, 2005, p. 557), culture is “defined as the set of key values, assumptions, understandings, and norms that is shared by members of an organization and taught to new members as correct.” As such, the idea of culture gained traction in the early 1980s, as United States corporations sought to understand the superior performance by Japanese counterparts (Daft, 2005). Schein in 1992 (as cited in Daft, 2005) established the idea that levels of culture exist, of which both visible and invisible aspects can be leveraged, in an effort to shape culture as desired.

### *Transformational Era*

Van Seters and Field (1990) conclude that the transformational era is “the latest and most promising phase in the evolutionary development of leadership theory” (p. 37). Looking backwards, they believed this era is a “dramatic improvement over previous eras” (p. 37). In looking forward, from 1990, they optimistically believed that “perhaps we have finally arrived at a definitive concept of leadership” (p. 39), but warned that “perhaps we are entering yet another era.”

### Transformational Leadership Theory

The concepts of transactional and transformational leadership are put forward by Burns (1978) and the full-range leadership model as championed by Bass (1985) and refined by Bass and Avolio (1994) and Avolio in 1999. Elements associated with this theory include charismatic leadership, *laissez-faire* non-leadership, transactional leadership, and transformational leadership. Factors associated with transactional leadership include contingent reward and management-by-exception, active and passive.

Factors associated with transformational leadership include idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration.

#### *Charismatic Leadership*

House in 1976 (as cited in Northouse, 2004) introduced the idea of charismatic leadership, and unfortunately, “it is often described in ways that make it similar to, if not synonymous with, transformational leadership” (p. 171). Burns (1978) denounces charismatic leadership, which he terms heroic leadership, because he views the idolized differently than leaders who embrace motives and goals that are sincerely shared by leaders and followers (Couto, 1995).

#### *Laissez-faire as a Non-Leadership Factor*

*Laissez-faire* behavior reflects the absence of leadership (Northouse, 2004, p. 179). Taken from the French phrase *laissez-faire*, this behavior is manifested by a “hands off--let things ride approach” (p. 179). In warning of the dangers of this behavior, Bass and Avolio (1994) suggest that *laissez-faire* supervisors “may simply fail to pick up relevant information or may send cues to others that they are not interested in receiving new information and ideas to advance or improve their work” (p. 210).

#### *Transactional Leadership*

Transactional leadership, first put forward by Burns (1978, p. 19), is leadership that “occurs when one person takes the initiative in making contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of valued things.” The exchange dimension is the primary variable associated with the concept of transactional leadership. As an example, the promise by Bush to not raise taxes, in exchange for votes, reflects the practice of transactional leadership (Northouse, 2004).

Burn's (1978) work was matured into a transformational and transactional leadership model as championed by Bass (1985) and refined by Bass and Avolio (1994) and Avolio in 1999. As such, the model proposes that two factors, contingent reward and management-by-exception, active and passive, be placed in the transactional leadership portion of the full range leadership model.

### *Transformational Leadership*

The idea of transformational leadership is also put forward by Burns (1978) but via the term "transforming leadership" (p. 20). Burns champions that, "such leadership occurs when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality" (p. 20).

Bass (1985), Bass and Avolio (1994), and Avolio (1999) evolved Burn's work on transforming leadership. In so doing, the term transforming leadership lost traction to the term transformational leadership (Couto, 1995). Moreover, Bass expanded House's distinctive work on charismatic leadership, and as Yammarino reported in 1993 (as cited by Northouse, 2004, p. 173), suggests that "charisma is a necessary but not sufficient condition for transformational leadership." Finally, Bass proposes the factors idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration be placed in the transformational leadership portion of the full range leadership model.

### *Combined Approach*

"Organizational cultures have been typed according to how much they are transformational or transactional" (Bass & Avolio, 2004, p. 109). However, Bass and

Avolio do not advocate selecting one leadership style over the other. In fact, as an aid to leaders, they instead identify the dangers associated with selecting one extreme.

Specifically, a purely transactional culture, with no transformational leadership, stands the risk of becoming a rigid bureaucracy (Bass & Avolio, 2004). In contrast, a purely transformational culture might be “surfeited with innovations and good ideas but remain short on coordination and cost controls” (p. 110). A high-contrast culture, which encompasses a great deal of both transformational and transactional leadership, may be hampered by internal conflict. Finally, Bass and Avolio label an organization, which has neither transformational nor transactional leadership, a garbage can culture that stands the chance of deteriorating into organizational anarchy.

### Measuring Leadership

In this study, leadership styles were empirically assessed by analyzing pieces of communication delivered by both leaders, via a non-probability sample design, and by the employment of content analysis research techniques. Findings were then applied to the concepts of transactional and transformational leadership as put forward by Burns (1978) and the full-range leadership model as championed by Bass (1985) and refined by Bass and Avolio (1994) and Avolio in 1999.

This study was conducted under the assumption that transactional and transformational leadership style can be measured via content analysis, and that this technique retains the same validity and reliability as the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) and applicable derivatives as championed by Bass (1985) and refined by Bass and Avolio (1994) and Avolio in 1999. As such, no measurement instruments, such as the MLQ or MLQ-6S, were employed in this study. Finally, the

overall percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language were measured per independent variable, versus a score for each factor in the full range leadership model, which is customarily attainable when using the MLQ or an applicable derivative.

### Meta-Analysis

Dozens of studies that explore transformational, transactional, and *laissez-faire* leadership styles were reviewed to access primary sources of information on areas of interest. However, most studies are cross-sectional designs that employ the MLQ or an applicable derivative. Information garnered was rich, but the following meta-analysis was selected for inclusion in this literature review because 38% of the studies use measurement instruments other than the MLQ. Regarding this study, Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, and van Engen (2003) put forward that “although the numbers of studies using other measures were relatively small the transformational data appear similar to those of the MLQ studies” (p. 579).

Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, and van Engen (2003) conducted a meta-analysis of 45 (N = 45) published and unpublished studies related to the transformational or transactional leadership styles of male and female leaders. Coded were general characteristics, characteristics of the leader and their roles, attributes of leadership styles, and when provided in some studies, the extent to which female and male leaders produced favorable outcomes. The difference between the leadership style of the male and females in this study was divided by the pooled standard deviation, which was calculated as an effect size of *g*. Positive effect sizes indicated that men scored higher on leadership style while negative effect sizes indicated that women scored higher. To help

mitigate bias, the  $g$ s were converted to Cohen's  $d$ s. All statistical tests reported retain a level of 95% or more confidence ( $p \leq .05$ ).

Overall, females scored higher in transactional leadership ( $d = -0.10$ ) than males. Females also scored higher than males in the subscales of charisma ( $d = -0.09$ ), idealized influence (attribute) ( $d = -0.12$ ), inspirational motivation ( $d = -0.05$ ), intellectual stimulation ( $d = -0.05$ ) and individualized consideration ( $d = -0.19$ ). Regarding transactional leadership, scores for overall effect size was not reported, but females scored higher than males in the subscale of contingent reward ( $d = -0.13$ ). Males, however, scored higher than females in the transactional subscales of management by exception-active ( $d = 0.12$ ) and management by exception-passive ( $d = 0.27$ ). Males also scored higher than females in the non-leadership category of *laissez-faire*. ( $d = 0.16$ ).

#### Two Journeys to Executive Leadership

The tailored biographies of Bush and McPeak draw heavily from the academic disciplines of security and strategic studies, history, and political science. However, this dissertation is first and foremost a contribution toward leadership studies. As such, the crafting and presentations of the biographies are designed to augment discussions on leadership theory.

For example, scholars or practitioners interested in Great-Man theories are provided information on traits and personalities Bush and McPeak displayed along the way. In addition, one interested in how behavior may be contingent on situations are afforded plenty of situations, to include ages during the activities, with an emphasis on the Cold War, fiscal challenges, regional conflicts and organizational changes. Finally, any propensity toward transactional or transformational leadership is included.

*The Genesis of George H. W. Bush*

George H. W. Bush was born June 12, 1924 in Milton, Massachusetts and then moved with his parents to Greenwich, Connecticut less than two years later (Naftali, 2007). At age 18 and upon his 1942 graduation from Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts, Bush “enlisted in the Navy’s flight training program as a seaman second class” (Bush, 1999, p. 23).

Bush grew up amid a national mood of isolationism and desire for neutrality despite the rise of Adolf Hitler and Axis aggression in Europe (Millett & Maslowski, 1994). However, on December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and other United States-interests in the Pacific (Millett & Maslowski, 1994). This Sunday attack made “a profound impact at that very moment” (Parmet, 1997, p. 42) on Bush, which prompted a “hardly wait to get out of school and enlist” ambition (Bush, 1999, p. 23).

*The Genesis of Merrill A. McPeak*

“Merrill A. McPeak was born January 9, 1936 in Santa Rosa, California [and graduated] from Grants Pass Union High School, Grants Pass, Oregon, in 1953” (Keck, et al., 1997, p. 228). He earned a degree in economics from San Diego State College in 1957 and a United States Air Force commission, with distinguished graduate honors, via the Reserve Officer Training Corps (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak).

McPeak witnessed World War II as a child and then matured amid the genesis of the Cold War. As such, he was a teenager in 1949 as Mao Tse-tung led Chinese Communists to victory over Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists (Millett & Maslowski, 1994). The Korean War followed a year later and the 1953 armistice prompted a “long haul” strategy with the “Soviet-American competition accepted as the central fact in



international relations” (p. 531). Without a doubt, the overt message that inculcated young McPeak was, “beware of the Soviets and maintain American superiority” (p. 534).

*Bush the Officer and Pilot*

Bush’s journey to officer and pilot in the United States Navy, from 1942 to 1943, occurred at the Naval Aviation Pre-Flight School in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, Wold-Chamberlain Naval Air Station in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, Texas (Bush, 1999). While in training, Bush wrote, “I’ll be an officer soon. It just is something I’ve really wanted and now it looks like I’m going to get it, [sic] I find it hard to believe” (p. 34). In 1943, he was commissioned an ensign, became the youngest pilot in the Navy, and was selected to fly torpedo bombers (Naftali, 2007).

In May 1944, Bush began flying combat missions against the Japanese, was downed by enemy antiaircraft fire three months later, and rescued by a patrolling submarine (Naftali, 2007). He could have “gone stateside after being shot down [but] returned to his ship and flew another eight missions over the Japanese-occupied Philippines” (Naftali, 2007, p. 8-9).

Regarding motivation for military service, Bush wrote in 1942, “The Navy itself is great, but what we are here for is even greater...” (Bush, 1999, p. 24). As for upcoming combat duty, he wrote in 1943, “I cannot wait -- not because of the glamour or the thrills...but because it is my job, clearly defined and it must be done” (p. 35).

Bush was “mustered out” of the Navy upon the surrender of Japan in August, 1945 (Naftali, 2007, p. 9). He had no interest in remaining in the Navy as a pilot after the successful conclusion of the war or pursuing a civilian flying career. In fact, as early as 1943, Bush declared, “I wouldn’t want to fly all my life for a living” (p. 37).

*McPeak the Pilot and Officer*

In 1959, McPeak completed pilot training as a lieutenant and was selected to fly fighter aircraft (Hopper, 1997). In December 1959, he completed F-100 combat crew training at United States Air Force bases in Arizona and Nevada (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak). From December 1959 to May 1964, he was assigned to tactical fighter squadrons and flew the F-100C in California and then the F-100D in England (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak).

McPeak flew fighters during a precarious period of the Cold War, in which “the character of the Soviet threat had become a major political issue” (Millett & Maslowski, 1994, p. 536). However, McPeak (1995, p. 342) “had no intention of making the Air Force a career” but primarily remained in the service because of his love for flying. Addressing Secretary of Defense Elliot Cohen directly during retirement remarks, McPeak unabashedly shared early “flying came first” career decisions:

The Air Force way of life kept me, but flying came first. As I said, I’d like to talk about it, but I literally cannot tell you what flying has meant to me. It is a puzzle, how to express it. Many fliers present will understand, but they can’t explain it either or even talk about it at length without recourse to nonverbal gestures -- to “flying with the hands,” as we say. I can only tell you that, for me, flying is a kind of music -- mysterious, half-understood, enigmatic -- and wonderful in the same way that music is full of wonder because it somehow makes contact with that ancient, mythical self -- the genetic remnant, I suppose, of a time when man’s precursors felt the exhilaration of swinging from tree to tree. I can’t explain it (p. 342).

*Bush's Transition from Naval Officer to Texas Oilman*

After World War II, Bush entered Yale in 1945 as a 21-year old married freshman armed with a distinguished flying cross, two gold stars (Naftali, 2007), and three Air Medals (George Bush Presidential Library and Museum - Biography). Following graduation three years later with a degree in economics, he moved to West Texas and entered the oil business (Naftali, 2007). In 1953, Bush and partners created Zapata Petroleum. “An amicable spit among the Zapata partners in the late 1950s earned George Bush...his first million [dollars]” (p. 12), which in turn allowed a move to Houston in 1959 and the subsequent pursuit of politics just prior to age 40.

Concurrently with McPeak the teenager, but through the lens of a combat veteran, Bush observed post-1949 global events, such as the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek and the war in Korea (Millett & Maslowski, 1994). Albeit slight, the potential of Bush being recalled to fly combat missions in Korea as a near-30-year-old pilot was something “everyone at least thought about” (Bush, 1999, p. 70). Regarding this prospect, Bush wrote in 1951, “I would, of course, hate to go back in the Navy again, hate to leave the family and all, yet I suppose that if this [war in Korea] becomes an all out thing, my whole attitude will change (p. 70).

*McPeak: Grooming for Greatness*

McPeak transitioned from a 21-year-old student in Officer Preflight Training in 1957 to a 40-year old colonel in 1976 via flight, Pentagon staff, command, and school assignments. Seminal career highlights include service as a demonstration pilot with the United States Air Force Thunderbird team from 1966 to 1968, combat operations in Vietnam from 1968 to 1969, and attendance at key professional military education

programs such as the Armed Forces Staff College in 1970 and National War College from 1973 to 1974 (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak). Concurrent with his graduation from National War College, McPeak received a master's degree in international relations from George Washington University (Keck, et al., 1997).

Following graduation, McPeak returned to flying fighter aircraft as the assistant deputy commander for operations at a tactical fighter wing in Florida. In 1975, he was assigned to French language training in preparation for an assignment as air attaché to the Republic of Cambodia (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak). "However, America's withdrawal from Southeast Asia [prompted] McPeak's orders [to be] changed" (Keck, et al., 1997, p. 228-229). Consequently, he became an up-and-coming colonel assigned to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City, and then was selected to command a combat support group in England in 1976 (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak).

The first 20-years of McPeak's career were a chaotic era in Cold War history. For example, the Soviet Union generated panic in 1957 with the launch of a *Sputnik* satellite into orbit. One year later, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated the Soviet Union could deploy 500 nuclear missiles against the United States and allies by 1961 (Millett & Maslowski, 1994). McPeak also experienced the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis from the perspective of an F-100D fighter pilot assigned to a tactical fighter squadron in Europe (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak). Finally McPeak observed firsthand, and then studied in National War College and the Council on Foreign Relations, the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, the beginning of a massacre in Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge (Fernandez-Armesto, 2003), and continued ambitions by the Soviet Union for communist expansion (Millett & Maslowski, 1994).

*Bush: Leadership and Political Crucibles*

Bush turned 40-years-old in 1964, having earned his first political post as County Chairman of the Houston Republican Party, and with sights on becoming the second of two Republican senators from Texas in 1965 (Naftali, 2007). He lost the senate race but earned a congressional seat in 1966 and was reelected in 1968. In this leadership position, “Bush revealed that his instincts were to find common ground...to reach across the aisle to Democrats and to try and make government work” (p. 17). In 1968, Bush had become “a rising star in the Republican Party” and one who “was positioning himself to play a larger national role” (p. 19).

While McPeak piloted fighter jets, commanded in combat, and underwent grooming during the chaotic 1960s and 1970s, Bush cleverly sharpened his skills in political risk management amid sticky political situations (Naftali, 2007). For example, he championed support for the military and a strong defense in the midst of the unpopular Vietnam War. Moreover, Congressman Bush traveled on a fact-finding trip to Vietnam during hostilities in December 1967 and concluded “the war was tearing [the] country apart” (Bush, 1999, p. 106). Finally, Bush attempted to stir up a public outcry and letter writing campaign in July 1970 toward leaders of North Vietnam for the horrific treatment of American prisoners of war (Bush, 1999).

However, at about the same time McPeak entered grooming as a 32-year-old field grade officer in 1968, several events began to derail 44-year-old Bush’s political aspirations. First, and to Bush’s surprise, his desire to be Richard M. Nixon’s vice president in 1968 was not accommodated (Naftali, 2007). Second, the “incoherence of Bush’s political image” (p. 22) was revealed upon the loss of a 1970 senate campaign.

Third, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was annoyed when Nixon offered Bush the job of permanent representative to the United Nations in 1971, which in turn resulted in a frustrating relationship with resentment and criticism (Naftali, 2007).

Without a doubt, the timing of the 1972 to 1974 Watergate Scandal was devastating to Bush's political aspirations. He had been selected as chairman of the Republican National Committee in 1973 (George Bush Presidential Library and Museum - Biography). However the year prior, on June 17, 1972, a group of burglars linked to an organization charged to support Nixon's reelection bid, albeit outside of the Republican National Committee, was caught and arrested for planting "listening devices in the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee" (Naftali, 2007, p. 26).

Nixon subsequently resigned amid scandal in 1974, Vice-President Gerald Ford was elevated to President, and Bush was again passed over for vice president. He then took a "sojourn, a time-out, [sic] a respite from Washington and political wars" (Parmet, 1997, p. 173) as the Chief of the United States Liaison Office in China (George Bush Presidential Library and Museum - Biography).

While in China, Bush planned another bid for vice president in 1976 (Naftali, 2007). However, "George and wife Barbara Bush cried" when they learned his post-China assignment would be as director of Central Intelligence because it was an "unwanted stepping stone" that "would presumably end his political future" (p. 31).

Bush subsequently loved his job at the Central Intelligence Agency (Bush, 1999), but the negative political prediction became close to reality upon the 1976 presidential election of Democrats Jimmy Carter and Vice President Walter Mondale. The newly

Democrat-centric White House prompted Republican-Bush's departure from Washington D. C. in 1977 and back to Texas as a 52-year-old private citizen (Naftali, 2007).

*McPeak: Leadership in the Carter Crucible*

As Bush departed Washington D. C. with Carter taking over the presidency in 1977, McPeak was well established in his combat support group command and ready for more challenges (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak). As documented by Worden (1998), and fortuitous for McPeak as a fighter pilot, the United States Air Force transitioned from embracing bomber-centric leaders to promoting officers with fighter pilot backgrounds to senior rank from 1973 to 1982. As such, from 1976 to 1982, McPeak was garnered opportunities to transition from his command of the combat support group in England to Vice Commander of a tactical fighter wing in Spain, command a tactical fighter wing in England, and broadening experiences via two staff assignments in West Germany (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak). These experiences and circumstances groomed McPeak for the first of four stars that would eventually be conferred, and indeed, he was promoted to brigadier general on July 1, 1981 at the age of 45 (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak).

Experiences gained while practicing leadership alongside North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners in Europe from 1976 to 1981, in an effort to deter a Soviet invasion during a forbidding period of the Cold War, were taxing for McPeak. Millett and Maslowski (1977, p. 608) put forward that Carter took office in January 1977 after "making an electoral virtue of his foreign policy innocence" but this innocence turned into a national security policy that "managed to irritate and perplex in equal measure the American people, Congress, America's allies abroad, and the Soviet Union" (p. 609).

While Carter emphasized the importance of NATO, and deterrence efforts by McPeak and his team certainly thwarted the Soviet Union, Carter's national security policy became notable for "vacillation and moralistic amateurism" (p. 609). As such, political challenges generated by the Carter administration provided McPeak opportunities to be recognized and rewarded for practicing leadership amid volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (National Defense University).

### *The Bush Comeback*

The 1977 Carter-induced retreat to Texas was tumultuous for Bush. Most troubling was his surprisingly low amount of money, with "income from investments in 1976 just \$34,000" (Parmet, 1997, p. 208). As such, Bush reverted back to his skills as a businessman, held four jobs in rapid succession, and generated revenue via consulting, speaking engagements, investments, and other prospects. Lucrative opportunities quickly abounded in Texas for Bush, and without a doubt, he "could have retired in Houston without any loss of pride or dignity" (Parmet, 1997, p. 207).

However, while deemed politically disadvantageous, Bush was sad about leaving his job as a Republican leading the Central Intelligence Agency (Bush, 1999). Moreover, he quickly became bored with private life, and although building wealth again, did not "want to slip into [the] 3 to 4 martini late dinner rich social thing" (Naftali, 2007, p. 34). Consequently, and admitting the idea was "overwhelmingly presumptuous and egotistical" (p. 34), Bush decided to challenge Carter for the 1981 presidential race.

While Bush prepared for political battle, the Soviet Union, frustrated by the foreboding deterrence by NATO in Europe, was challenging Carter with a new Cold War strategy (Millett & Maslowski, 1994). Specifically, via the policy of horizontal



escalation, the Soviet Union redirected resources away from the predictable European-centric World War III scenario and redeployed assets worldwide in an effort to generate global communist influence (Millett & Maslowski, 1994). At the same time, Carter's national defense policy provided Bush opportunities to project a hawkish foreign policy stance, such as opposing arms control agreements with the Soviets and criticizing the plan to return the American-built Panama Canal to Panama (Naftali, 2007). Finally, the failure of the Carter administration to solve problems in Iran, to include the seizure of Americans in the embassy and a catastrophic rescue attempt in April, 1980, "only dramatized apparent American impotence" (Millett & Maslowski, 1994, p. 613).

All these events, compounded by a lingering hostage situation in Tehran, served as a catalyst to promote Bush-led deviations from Carter-centric "minimalist defense policies and non-interventionism" (Millett & Maslowski, 1994, p. 613). As such, Bush began 1980 as a strong contender for the presidency, campaigned against Ronald Reagan during the Republican primaries, but then had to disappointingly drop out after being overpowered by Reagan's charisma and political savvy (Naftali, 2007). Reagan harbored doubts about Bush, based on some political gaffes during the primaries, but still offered him an opportunity to serve as his running mate so long as he would support the Reagan platform. Bush agreed, a powerful Reagan-Bush team formed, and Carter "received a stunning rejection by the voters" (Millett & Maslowski, 1994, p. 614). Consequently, the Reagan-Bush administration began in January, 1981.

#### *Bush as Vice President: Understudy to Reagan*

The decisive win in 1980 by Reagan and Bush against Carter and Mondale "gave Bush the [vice president] job he had been dreaming about since the late 1960s" (Naftali,

2007, p. 39). Bush did not fully agree with the Reagan agenda, but had pledged to perform “the trick of the political chameleon [during the campaign and] present himself as a man of the hard [sic] Right” (p. 39). As vice president, Bush tried to keep a low profile, be loyal, and fit in but was perceived as “a stranger to the new right, a Johnny-come-lately to their conservative cause” (Parmet, 1997, p. 256). Regardless, Bush succeeded in this role and developed a “warm, cordial, and respectful” (p. 256) relationship with Reagan. In fact, Bush became “the ‘nice man’ around the White House...who tried to blend into the crowd of Reaganites” (p. 263).

Unlike McPeak and Bush, Reagan had not seen combat as a wartime pilot, but instead had made training films for the United States Army Air Forces in World War II (Millett & Maslowski, 1994). Regardless, Reagan “had a deep intuition that the world respected military force and that the American people wanted an assertive foreign policy” (p. 614). As such, he elected to “rearm the armed forces” with Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger as “the Pentagon’s chief cheerleader” (p. 615).

This genesis position marked the bases of defense planning and spending that centered on “preparedness for a sustained nuclear or nonnuclear war with the Soviet Union and its allies” (Millett & Maslowski, 1994, p. 615). In fact, Reagan was especially concerned with the Soviet policy of horizontal escalation because it professed the global leveraging of Soviet military power. In response, he believed the United States had to be equally capable, and as such, placed a special emphasis on the ability to project naval and Airpower worldwide. Finally, Reagan “called for the active support of anti-communist insurgencies wherever they could be found” (p. 615), and as an example, provided support for anti-Sandinista guerrillas, known as *Contras*, who were fighting communist

forces in and around Nicaragua. This stance toward global defense was robustly championed in the first four years of the Reagan-Bush administration (Millett & Maslowski, 1994).

*McPeak on the Fast Track*

Following promotion to brigadier general in July, 1981, at the age of 45, McPeak pursued three senior staff opportunities immediately after relinquishing command of his tactical fighter wing in England (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak). First, in West Germany he served as the chief of staff, Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe. In 1982, McPeak returned to the United States, served in a key planning job in Virginia, and earned his second star just one year later, in 1983, which signified his promotion to major general. McPeak was then assigned a deputy chief of staff job in Washington D.C., whereby he managed programs and resources for the United States Air Force, and at the age of 49 on May 22, 1985, earned the third star of a lieutenant general (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak).

McPeak clearly thrived during the genesis of the Reagan-Bush era. Prior to his promotion to lieutenant general in 1985, his experiences ranged from witnessing the release of American hostages from the seized embassy in Iran, minutes after Reagan took the oath of office in 1981 (Neufeld, 1997), to managing generous Cold War defense spending linked to a strategic competition with the Soviet Union (Millett & Maslowski, 1994). Without a doubt, McPeak and his team benefited from the positive relationship Reagan and Bush built with the military. In fact, while generalizing military service under the Reagan-Bush administration, Powell (1995, p. 315) put forward in March, 1986, that “America once more embraced its armed forces.”

*Reagan and Bush Part II*

Regarding their bid for reelection in 1984, Reagan and Bush enjoyed a landslide victory. According to Parmet (1997, p. 294), “The ineptitude of Reagan’s opponents [Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro] only became apparent at the campaign’s later stages...” Consequently, Reagan and Bush routed Mondale and Ferraro, “with Mondale only taking his home state of Minnesota and the District of Columbia” (p. 299). Reagan and Bush took their second oaths of office on January 21, 1985, and according to Barbara Bush’s diary, “George’s 1988 campaign for president started on that Monday” (p. 301).

Unfortunately for Bush, his path toward the 1989 presidency required him to overcome political damage from the 1984 election and subsequent service as a second term vice president. For example, the media treated him more harshly than Reagan during the campaign (Bush, 1999) and zealously focused on a technical tax issue, associated with a previous home sale, which resulted in Bush having to pay about \$200,000 in back taxes plus interest (Parmet, 1997). Second, the subservient nature of being a “good soldier” (p. 330) for Reagan began to wear on Bush and was critically focused upon by the media (Bush, 1999). During the campaign in July, 1984, Bush wrote “I get sick of vice presidential jokes... the political satirists and commentators continue to downgrade the job... There are frustrations at 3 ½ years” (p. 337).

Much worse, the infamous Iran-Contra scandal broke on November 3, 1986 (Bush, 1999). Bush knew the United States was secretly selling arms to Iran with the hope this controversial action would improve relations and prompt the return of hostages (Bush, 1999). However, he adamantly denied he knew that, in violation of federal law, excess money was being illegally transferred to support the *Contras* in Nicaragua (Bush,

1999). In the role of “loyal lieutenant” to Reagan, Bush tried to downplay events during a November 7, 1986 television address but “incautious comments” prompted a scolding on integrity from Secretary of State George Schultz (Naftali, 2007, p. 46). Realizing he had told a “bald-faced lie” (p. 46) on television, Bush became “terrified that his chance at the presidency was in mortal danger...” (p. 48). In the end, he politically survived but “Iran-Contra remained a millstone on Bush’s neck” (p. 50).

Despite these challenges, 63-year-old Bush, on October 12, 1987 in the Hyatt Regency Ballroom of Houston, Texas, announced his candidacy for the 1988 presidential election (Bush, 1999). Although the celebratory announcement was grand, it was marred the same week by a *Newsweek* cover story entitled “Fighting the Wimp Factor” (Naftali, 2007, p. 51). Ten days later, Bush wrote in his diary that the *Newsweek* story was “the cheapest shot” he had ever seen in his political life, and that his handlers wanted him “to be tough now, pick a fight with somebody, [and] stand for something controversial” (Bush, 1999, p. 369). He followed this statement in his diary with the comment, “Maybe they’re right, but this is a hell of a time in life to start being something I’m not” (p. 369).

#### *McPeak in Command of Air Force South*

Having pinned on the three stars of a lieutenant general in May, 1985, McPeak in 1987, at the age of 51, was charged to command 12th Air Force, and collaterally, United States Southern Command Air Forces from an Air Force base in Texas (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak). In this leadership role, McPeak was tasked to “manage all Air Force personnel and assets in the United States Southern Command area of responsibility [which included] Central and South America” (12th Air Force Library).

In the context of Cold War history, McPeak faced a formidable threat in Latin America and the Caribbean. Regarding major issues challenging the United States Air Force during this period, Brigadier General Burton R. Moore (1988, p. 5.18) put forward, “The improved military capabilities of unfriendly nations and the corresponding rise in regional instability have increased requirements.” In addition, Moore championed that “a regional coalition warfare capability to deal with both internal and external threats [was] a top priority (p. 5.18). Finally, while Bush “shaped” the political “mess” of the Iran-Contra scandal (Naftali, 2007, p. 48), McPeak inherited Airpower-centric problems associated with the pragmatic Nicaragua predicament of anti-Sandinista guerrillas, recently cut off from illegal aid from the United States, who were still in battle with communist forces (Millett & Maslowski, 1994).

In line with Reagan’s “assertive foreign policy” (Millett & Maslowski, 1994, 614), the formidable threats McPeak faced as a commander were matched by tremendous forces at his disposal. Specifically, 12th Air Force had five air divisions (Air Force Association, 1988). One division was responsible for the joint defense of the Panama Canal while four others, along with 13 wings, retained the capability of “tactical fighter operations and training, reconnaissance, tactical air control, and a wide range of electronic combat tasks” (p. 143-144). Through his parent headquarters, Tactical Air Command, McPeak and his team were prepared to leverage 119,000 people and 4,000 aircraft, plus if mobilized, an additional 70,000 members of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserves along with their 1,400 aircraft (Air Force Association, 1988).

From a leadership perspective, this assignment was rich for McPeak. Specifically, 1987 was the first year that 12th Air Force was charged with substantial United States

Southern Command responsibilities (12th Air Force Library). In addition, this command provided a much greater level of responsibility than his previous command of a single fighter wing from 1980 to 1981 (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak). Finally, his superiors selected him to command Pacific Air Forces, which was an even larger organization. As such, in July, 1988, McPeak relinquished his command and traveled to Hawaii for his next leadership opportunity (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak).

*Bush's Final Journey to the Unipolar Moment*

Bush's preparations for presidential leadership amid the genesis of the unipolar moment culminated upon his successful presidential election against Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts in November, 1988 (Naftali, 2007). However, before his 1989 inauguration, three key issues in 1988, to include unique fiscal challenges, the selection of a realist as national security advisor, and a combination of skepticism and pragmatism toward the Soviet Union, would subsequently influence the Bush presidency.

The first key issue, which involved attempts to mitigate a swollen budget deficit, already surfaced in 1985, and again in 1987, in the form of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill (Naftali, 2007). Well before the 1988 election, it was "undeniable that whoever became president in January 1989 would face a daunting challenge [since the bill] mandated a steady reduction in the budget deficit to zero by 1991 [and required] draconian across-the-board spending cuts" (p. 52).

Pragmatists in the Bush camp believed the bill would eventually prompt new taxes, but against advice and attempting to sound tough during his bid for president, Bush delivered his one-liner, "Read my lips: No new taxes" pledge at the Republican National Convention in 1988 (Naftali, 2007, p. 61). The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill, coupled

with unforeseen fiscal challenges that would surface during his presidency, ultimately nullified this promise. Bush knew before his inauguration the budget issue threatened political damage, and on January 7, 1989 wrote, "If it weren't for the damned deficit I'd be kicking up my heels and feeling like a spring colt" (Bush, 1999, p. 408).

The second key issue of 1988 involved the selection of former United States Air Force General Brent Scowcroft as national security advisor (Naftali, 2007). Scowcroft "had been a student of the influential realist scholar Hans Morgenthau" (p. 66), distrusted Soviet Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev, and wholeheartedly refused to embrace the Kremlin's early rhetoric for peace. As such, this selection "signaled a return to the realist foreign policies of the Nixon and Ford years" (p. 66).

This realist perspective, versus activism and creativity, proved to be less than ideal amid the tumultuous activities associated with the genesis of the unipolar moment. Specifically, while Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Secretary of State James Baker provided stimulating options that "defined the two extremes in the advice that Bush received on Gorbachev...Scowcroft was always somewhere in the middle" (Naftali, 2007, p. 77). This dogmatic anti-Soviet stance by the national security advisor would impede the development of strategic options during the Bush presidency.

Finally, the third key issue of 1988 involved Bush's stance toward the Soviet Union. In stark contrast to Reagan and his "late-term embrace" of the Soviets (Naftali, 2007, p. 66), but less draconian than Scowcroft, Bush favored skepticism and pragmatic plans that focused on leveraging, versus embracing, relationships with the Soviets.

Bush seized opportunities early to distance himself from Reagan policies regarding the Soviets that he deemed problematic. In fact, and quite unlike Reagan, Bush



displayed an impolite demeanor toward Gorbachev during a summit in New York just weeks before becoming president, which in turn left the Soviet leader worried about the potential hawkish perspective Bush might embrace as president (Naftali, 2007). Bush knew he had to build a working relationship with the Soviets, but upon his inauguration on January 20, 1989, the 64-year-old Bush had defined his presidency and relationship with the Soviet Union as “Bush I and not Reagan III” (p. 65).

*McPeak's Final Journey to the Unipolar Moment*

McPeak assumed command of Pacific Air Forces in Hawaii on July 22, 1988, and ten days later at the age of 52, was promoted to four-star general (Keck, et al., 1997). This promotion to the highest rank attainable by military officers at the time, coupled with experiences garnered from leading Pacific Air Forces for two years, positioned and prepared McPeak for his eventual role as the chief of staff of the United States Air Force and national security leader. While the vastness of his Pacific command and formidable Soviet threats he faced groomed him for higher levels of responsibility, Powell (1995, p. 478) attributed his “energy and imagination” as catalysts for his success.

Regarding the vastness of his command, McPeak led the principle air arm of the United States Pacific Command, which was responsible for an “area extending from the west coast of the Americas to the east coast of Africa and from the Arctic to the Antarctic” (Air Force Association, 1989, p. 83). McPeak’s area of responsibility, which included half the world’s surface, 39-countries, and more than two billion people, spanned 17 time zones and more than 12,000 miles (Air Force Association, 1989).

The Soviet threats McPeak faced in the Pacific were formidable. According to The Joint Staff (1989, p. 23), “Shortly after coming to power [in 1985], Gorbachev

announced that the Soviet Union would become a true Pacific power.” McPeak and his team were challenged by these Cold War threats because, unlike conventional forces, the dangers were multifaceted. For example, the Soviet Union bolstered both the quantity and quality of military forces and then deployed them into the far reaches of the Pacific (The Joint Staff, 1989). In addition to facing military combatants, McPeak coped with political leveraging by the Soviets, which included “invigorated diplomatic offensives in major Pacific capitals, expanded security assistance programs, and attempts to penetrate markets” (p. 23). In response, McPeak was charged to lead the Airpower necessary to “help stabilize the region, to deter conflict, and should deterrence fail, to fight and win” (Air Force Association, 1989, p. 84).

Toward the end of his Pacific command, McPeak became “one of three finalists for the Air Force Chief of Staff position in 1990, [but] when General Mike Dugan was selected, McPeak was directed to become the commander of Tactical Air Command” (Weber, S., 1990 as cited in Hopper, 1997, p. 3). However, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney fired Dugan for incautious comments made to the press during the Gulf War buildup (Powell, 1995). Powell then, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was charged to find a replacement. Regarding the selection of McPeak, Powell wrote:

On an earlier trip to the Pacific, I had met General Merrill “Tony” McPeak, a lean-as-leather fighter pilot, fifty-four years old, bursting with energy and imagination. I had been warned that McPeak was a hip shooter, prone to fire off ten ideas in one burst, of which three might be good. Not a bad average, as ideas go, so I recommended McPeak...and Tony became the new Air Force Chief of Staff (p. 478).

*Bush and McPeak: Groomed and Ready for Leadership*

In 1989 and 1990 respectively, Bush and McPeak achieved momentous goals commensurate with their choice of careers. For Bush the politician, seeking the greatest level of responsibility, this achievement was the successful election as President of the United States (Bush, 1999). For McPeak, as an officer seeking top military rank and responsibility, promotion to four-star general and service as the chief of staff of the United States Air Force was the pinnacle (Heritage of Merrill A. McPeak).

Much work was still to be done by Bush the president in 1989 and McPeak the general in 1990. However, these achievements positioned Bush and McPeak for the highest levels of national security decision making. In fact, and unbeknownst to the international community, as well as to Bush and McPeak themselves, these two leaders had been postured to oversee the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent genesis of the unipolar moment.

Summary

The purpose of this literature review was to put forward information that augments research associated with this study. Dependent variables, independent variables, and an opportunity to support and enhance any consideration of legacies Bush and McPeak may retain were the focus of this effort. As such, the evolution of leadership theory was explored with an emphasis on transactional and transformational leadership. Following this immersion, which included the practice of measuring leadership via a meta-analysis, tailored biographies of Bush and McPeak were presented in the context of leadership development.

## CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

### Overview

The methodology associated with this study supports the primary purpose of this dissertation. Specifically, content analysis research techniques were undertaken to ascertain if there is any significant difference in percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language, expressed by President Bush and General McPeak during the genesis of the unipolar moment, as a result of speaker and topic.

Associated methodology also supports a secondary issue regarding the timing of communication event delivery and the use of transactional and transformational leadership language. This secondary issue was attended to and is addressed.

Finally, information garnered from this study provides empirical contributions to any perceived legacies Bush and McPeak may retain from their unipolar experiences. However, while this study may bolster opportunities to consider legacies, no qualitative analysis or formal field study was accomplished (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). Consequently, legacy-centric methodology was not considered or accomplished, and thus will not be addressed.

This methodology section begins with the presentation of the sampling plan and expands the discussion on dependent and independent variables. Next, information on content analysis techniques, used as the primary instrument in this study, follows. Operational definitions for both dependent and independent variables are presented next, followed by a discussion on the research design. Six null hypotheses are then put forward just prior to the procedures undertaken to explore these propositions. Finally, a discussion on data collection and analysis, as well as ethical considerations, is included.

### Sampling Plan

Leadership styles were empirically assessed by analyzing selected communication events expressed by Bush and McPeak, via a non-probability sample design, using convenience and purposive samples garnered unobtrusively from archival records (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). Archival records for Bush were obtained from the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum in College Station, Texas. For McPeak, selected communication events were published by Air University (McPeak, 1995), which is located at Maxwell Air Force Base near Montgomery, Alabama.

### Research Questions

Six research questions, of which two were primary and four were secondary, were used in this study. The two primary questions were crafted to ascertain if there is any significant difference in the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language, expressed by Bush and McPeak during the genesis of the unipolar moment, as a result of speaker and topic.

Four additional research questions were crafted to address a secondary issue that surfaced after the commencement of this study. Specifically, a suspicion arose that a significant relationship might exist between the timing of communication event delivery and use of transactional or transformational leadership language by Bush and McPeak.

The following six research questions were addressed:

1. Is there a significant difference in percentages of transactional leadership language as a result of speaker and topic?
2. Is there a significant difference in percentages of transformational leadership language as a result of speaker and topic?

3. Is there a significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transactional leadership language by Bush?
4. Is there a significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transformational leadership language by Bush?
5. Is there a significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transactional leadership language by McPeak?
6. Is there a significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transformational leadership language by McPeak?

#### Primary Dependent and Independent Variables

The primary dependent variables in this study are the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language expressed by Bush and McPeak during the period of interest. The primary independent variables consist of the speakers, Bush and McPeak, and key topics they discussed while serving in their leadership positions. These topics are collectively categorized as fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns.

#### Secondary Dependent and Independent Variables

The suspicion that a significant relationship might exist between the timing of communication event delivery and the use of transactional or transformational leadership language prompted an effort to create secondary dependent and independent variables. Upon review, the primary dependent variable remained adequate to serve as a secondary dependent variable but a secondary independent variable had to be crafted.

In constructing a secondary independent variable, all pertinent communication events for Bush and McPeak were dated, assembled in chronological order, and assigned

a chronological rank based wholly on month and year of delivery. Consequently, the timing of communication event delivery, in accordance with the chronological rank, was then employed as a secondary independent variable.

### Instruments

According to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000, p. 486), “Quantitative research places great emphasis on methodology, on procedure, and on statistical measures of validity.” In meeting this requirement, this study employed content analysis research techniques. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias state:

Content analysis provides social scientists with a systematic methodology for analyzing the data obtained from archival records, documents, and the mass media. Instead of observing people’s behavior directly, or asking them questions about that behavior, the researcher obtains copies of the communications produced and asks questions about these records (p. 486).

Regarding specific content analysis instrumentation, Simstat for Windows 2.5 was used, which includes WordStat. In addition, data was transferred to SPSS version 13.

### Assumption and Limitation

This study was conducted under the assumption that transactional and transformational leadership concepts can be measured via content analysis, and that this technique retains the same validity and reliability as measurement tools, such as the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ), promoted by Bass (1985) and refined by Bass and Avolio (1994) and Avolio in 1999. However, outcomes using this technique may be limited, as they were in this study, to overall percentages of transactional and

transformational leadership language. This is in contrast to a score for each factor in the full range leadership model, which is customarily attainable when using the MLQ or an associated derivative.

#### Operational Definitions for Dependent Variables

For the dependent variables, operational definitions consist of the percentages of selected recording units, that exist amid context units, within a given communication event (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). These recording units can be words or terms, themes, characters, paragraphs, or items. In the end, “recording units are combined and coded into categories” (p. 298).

The primary dependent variables in this study are operationally defined as the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language expressed by Bush and McPeak during the period of interest. As such, the categories used for content analysis, regarding the primary dependent variables, are transactional and transformational leadership language. In turn, the recording units are words and word-phrases identified as recording units that were selected, based on representativeness of their particular category, from the pool of identified communication events. In this study, for the dependent variables, all recording units are either words or word-phrases.

Two hundred and twenty transactional words and 11 word-phrases, for a total of 231 communication items, were selected to represent the category of transactional leadership. In addition, 192 transformational words and three word-phrases, for a total of 195 communication items, were selected to represent the transformational leadership category. A detailed explanation of how these words and word-phrases were selected is located in the procedures section of this chapter.



### Operational Definitions for Independent Variables

For the primary independent variables, operational definitions consist of the speakers, Bush and McPeak, and the key topics they discussed while serving in their leadership positions. In the context of this study, Bush and McPeak are stand-alone categories that do not need to be further defined. However, key topics they discussed while serving in their leadership positions, which closely match with issues that existed during the period of interest, include fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns. A detailed explanation of how these topics were selected is located in the procedures section of this chapter.

For the secondary independent variable, the operational definition consists of the timing of communication event delivery. Specifically, communication event delivery was measured as a continuous variable, wholly based on the month and year of study, and is operationally defined as the chronological rank that ranges from one to 70.

### Research Design

This study used descriptive statistics to “summarize, organize, and simplify data” (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2007, p. 6). In so doing, displays of the data in the form of tables and figures “reflect the intellectual logic of the analysis” (Tufte, 1997, p. 31). As such, six tables and eight figures are contained in this study.

In addition, the 220 transactional words and 11 word-phrases selected to represent the category of transactional leadership are listed in Appendix A. The 192 transformational words and 3 word phrases selected to represent the transformational leadership category are listed in Appendix B. Finally, selected communication events by speaker, topic, date of delivery, and month of study are listed in Appendix C.

Statistical analysis in support of the primary purpose of this dissertation, which is to ascertain percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language, was accomplished via a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Statistical analysis for the secondary effort, regarding the timing of communication event delivery and the use of transactional and transformational leadership language, was accomplished via a Pearson Correlation Coefficient analysis. The level of significance deemed acceptable in this study was at least 95% certainty with five percent or less of doubt ( $p \leq .05$ ).

#### Null Hypotheses

Six null hypotheses, of which two are primary and four are secondary, were crafted for this study. The two primary null hypotheses address the potential for any significant difference in the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language, expressed by Bush and McPeak, as a result of speaker and topic.

Four additional null hypotheses were crafted to address the secondary concern that a significant relationship might exist between the timing of communication event delivery and the use of transactional or transformational leadership language.

This study examined the following six null hypotheses.

H<sub>01</sub>: There is no significant difference in percentages of transactional leadership language as a result of speaker and topic: categorized as fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns.

H<sub>02</sub>: There is no significant difference in percentages of transformational leadership language as a result of speaker and topic: categorized as fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns.

H<sub>03</sub>: There is no significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transactional leadership language by Bush.

H<sub>04</sub>: There is no significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transformational leadership language by Bush.

H<sub>05</sub>: There is no significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transactional leadership language by McPeak.

H<sub>06</sub>: There is no significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transformational leadership language by McPeak.

### Procedures

Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) champion, “Content analysis provides social scientists with a systematic methodology for analyzing the data obtained from archival records, documents, and the mass media” (p. 295). As such, the procedures employed in this study were consistent with accepted content analysis research techniques as put forward by Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias.

Ascertaining the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language used by Bush and McPeak began by determining topics that were representative of key issues that existed during the period of interest. Next, a sample of communication events, delivered by Bush and McPeak, deemed representative of key topics they addressed while serving in their leadership positions, was selected from archival data. Data were then loaded into content analysis software and coded based on speaker, topic, and timing of communication event delivery. Finally, transactional and transformational recording units were established, which were then subjected to statistical analysis.

### *Post-Cold War Topics*

Four key topics that Bush and McPeak discussed, while serving in their leadership positions, reflect independent variables associated with this study. These topics include fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns.

To establish these topics, and in conjunction with the selection of communication events used in this study, an effort was undertaken to determine if the key topics Bush and McPeak discussed, as contained in communication events sampled, reflected key issues that existed during the period of interest. As such, three processes were employed to determine post-Cold War topics.

### *Review of the Literature*

First, literature associated with post-Cold War history was reviewed. This review included the communication events delivered by Bush and McPeak as well as other sources of post-Cold War information. The purpose of these reviews was to determine key issues that existed during the period of interest.

“Some of the most dramatic and epochal events of the twentieth century took place during the short period of 1989 to 1991” (Bush & Scowcroft, 1999, p. xi). The Bush presidency began in 1989 and was immediately inundated with these events (Millett & Maslowski, 1994). Consequently, and upon review of 61 selected communication events (N = 61) delivered by Bush during his presidency, the key themes of fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, and organizational changes became clear. In fact, 10 communication events matched fiscal challenges (16.4%), 34 matched regional conflicts (55.7%), and 17 matched organizational changes (27.8%).

Kelly (as cited in McPeak, 1995, p. xvii) put forward that McPeak served as the chief of staff of the United States Air Force “as the nation was beginning to adjust to the reality of Western victory in the Cold War.” As such, a review of the communication events McPeak put forward during this period also match the central themes of fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, and organizational changes. Of the 48 selected for this study (N = 48), three communication events matched fiscal challenges (6.3%), 10 matched regional conflicts (20.1%), and 28 matched organizational changes (58.3%). Seven unrelated issues (14.6%) were placed in a category labeled other concerns.

Other sources of post-Cold War information suggest the categories of fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, and organizational changes, and other concerns reflect key issues that existed during the period of interest. Y’ Blood (1997) describes fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, and organizational changes, amid the post-Cold War period, through the lens of an Airpower historian. In addition, the Naval War College produced 44-essays regarding Post-Cold War considerations and planning factors with similar themes (Lloyd, R. M., et al., 1997).

Petrie (1994) captured 11 essays produced by senior military officers who had served in leadership positions during the genesis of unipolar moment, and then graduated from National Defense University in 1994. As such, he called attention to eight commonalities in the essays, of which three specifically address fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, and organizational changes. From Petrie:

Eleven authors addressing diverse aspects of our foreign and national security policy present some strikingly familiar themes ... The perception of severely limited resources and the need for renewed attention to our

economy and domestic issues cannot be ignored ... UN peace operations are war ... [and] action through the United Nations is likely (p. xix).

From this review of the literature, fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns were determined to be appropriate topics to collectively categorize key issues that existed during the period of interest. In fact, all of the Bush communication events fit into the three main topics. For the McPeak communication events, all but seven matched the three principal topics.

#### *Appearance System*

The second technique used to determine post-Cold War topics involved an appearance system. Specifically, an appearance system is normally a quantitative process that is systematically employed to help coders “search the material for the appearance of certain attributes” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000, p. 299). According to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, this process puts forward “explicit criteria for deciding which recording units fall into each category.”

The key topics Bush and McPeak discussed while serving in their leadership positions, which include fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns, are not categories to be populated by recording units. However a hybrid-process, akin to an appearance system, was designed and employed to help ascertain key issues that existed during the period of interest via the recognition of attributes. Consequently, the four topics found representative, to include the attributes used to help identify them, are as follows.

1. Fiscal challenges: Dealings, to include international, national, and United States Air Force-centric, which focused on resource limitations and

challenges. Examples include the economy, budgets, defense spending, national debt, and similar verbiage.

2. Regional conflicts: Events, to include peacekeeping activities, which prompted the use of military force. Examples include the Gulf War, Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Los Angeles riots, weapons of mass destruction, and similar verbiage.
3. Organizational changes: Actions or proposals, at international, domestic, and United States Air Force levels, aimed toward modifying existing structures to meet challenges. Examples include comments associated with a new world order, thousand points of light, the United Nations, domestic reform, and United States Air Force reorganization efforts.
4. Other concerns: Developed to categorize events that did not fit neatly into fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, or organizational changes categories.

#### *Expert Review*

The third technique used to determine post-Cold War topics involved experts. Specifically, topics were discussed with the Head, Department of Military Strategic Studies at the United States Air Force Academy (T. Drohan, personal communication, March 4, 2009). Moreover, in the context of statistical analysis, topics were reviewed by a faculty member assigned to the United States Air Force Academy's Department of Behavioral Sciences (S. Samuels, personal communication, March 4, 2009).

Finally, dissertation committee members reviewed the topics and contributed greatly. The committee chair, who is a retiree from the United States Army, had served as a military officer during the Cold War. Another committee member, who retired as a

Civil Servant from the United States Air Force, had also served during the Cold War. As such, the dissertation committee championed the assertion that key topics, existing throughout the period of interest, included fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns.

### *Sample of Communication Events*

The next major step in ascertaining the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language expressed by Bush and McPeak was to select a sample of appropriate communication events from which a pool of word or word-phrase candidates would be drawn. As such, four processes were employed that yielded 61-communication events for Bush (N = 61). For McPeak, 48-communication events were selected (N = 48). The total communication events selected for Bush and McPeak equaled 109 (N= 109). These communication events best represent key topics Bush and McPeak discussed while serving in their leadership positions.

### *Convenience Sampling*

The first process used, convenience sampling, is one of three major non-probability sample designs used by social scientists. Using this design, samples are selected based on “whatever sampling units are conveniently available” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000, p. 168). Due to the prolific nature of communication events archived at the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum, employing convenience sampling was not practical in selecting samples for Bush. However, the use of convenience sampling was ideal for collecting samples for McPeak.

Communication events McPeak made available were collected and published by Air University (McPeak, 1995). Certainly, other communication events by McPeak exist,



and in fact, he mentions in his author's preface that "much was left out" (p. xxiii) and he would have liked to include even more documents. However, the 48-communication events put forward by McPeak (1995) provide an adequate convenience sample that is of sufficient quality for this study. In fact, Kelly champions that this collection "preserves for Air Force members and future military scholars the words and thoughts of a true innovator – a man who led us through a period of unprecedented change" (p. xviii).

### *Purposive Sampling*

Purposive sampling is a second non-probability sample design used by social scientists. Using this design, subjective judgment by the researcher is used to select sampling units that appear to be representative of the population. (Frankfort Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).

For McPeak, some minor purposive sampling was conducted amid the primary task of convenience sampling. For example, one speech dated November 10, 1994 and one journal article dated March, 1995 were purposively excluded because they were published after McPeak left office. In addition, one speech delivered by McPeak on October 26, 1990, entitled "Three Themes for the Future" (1995, p. 1), was split into three topic-centric addresses that matched three categories.

In contrast, the use of purposive sampling was ideal for Bush. The George Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas retains a wealth of correspondence attributed to Bush. Complicatedly, the number of raw encounters with reporters that are documented, presidential news conferences, statements by press secretaries, and memos pertaining to a myriad of topics are prolific and potentially overwhelming.

In selecting communication events for the Bush sample, all public papers during the period of interest were reviewed for possible inclusion. In addition to national and international-centric speeches that were selected, two letters to Congress were identified as candidates. Another eleven speeches delivered to individual organizations, of which their content suggested richness for this study, were also included.

Two substantive speeches Bush delivered had dual topics that were diametrically distinct. The first, dated September 11, 1990, addressed the Persian Gulf crisis and then abruptly switched to the federal budget deficit. The second, dated January 29, 1991, was equally diametric on fiscal challenges and regional conflicts. As such, these two speeches were split and examined as four topic-centric addresses for assessment.

### *Comparative Studies*

Next, the 61-communication events that were selected ( $N = 61$ ) for Bush and the 48-communication events selected for McPeak ( $N = 48$ ) were considered alongside comparative studies. One Bush study and three McPeak studies used almost identical samples as this study, which in turn bolstered the face validity of the samples selected (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).

In a 2001 study of Bush and the Gallup Poll, Duesterberg selected 47-speeches Bush delivered that were “made to the national population such as inaugural, state of the union addresses, as well as ones made over the radio” (p. 32). He also selected two letters to Congress. Upon review, 47 of the 49 communication events Duesterberg selected were included in the 61-communication events judged adequate for this study ( $N = 61$ ).

In a 1997 study, Hopper evaluated the tenure of McPeak. In addition to the 48-communication events McPeak (1995) made public, Hopper based his findings on an

end-of-tour interview, not included in the McPeak collection, and a personal interview with McPeak. Comments Hopper provided regarding the two interviews were found to be colorful, but the McPeak collection published by Air University, which was also predominately used by Hopper, was judged to be adequate for this study.

In a 1996 study, McGuirk analyzed changes McPeak orchestrated from an “organizational culture management perspective” (p. ii). McGuirk used Schein’s model for assessing organizational culture, his personal experience, and the collection by McPeak (1995) as key sources. McGuirk puts forward that he “[read] through General McPeak’s many speeches [from] *Selected Works 1990-1994*” (p. 11). As such, the McPeak collection, which was principally employed by McGuirk, was judged to be equally adequate for this study.

Bussiere (2001) examined the leadership effectiveness of McPeak in the context of organizational change. In this study, he reached conclusions based on “official records and correspondence, interviews with key participants, published doctrine, and air staff briefings [plus] a variety of secondary books, research papers, and articles” (p. 2). However, Bussiere cited items from the McPeak (1995) collection eight times, and as such, these communication events were considered valuable for Bussiere and thus adequate for this study.

#### *Expert Review*

Dissertation committee members reviewed the selected communication events and contributed greatly to this effort. In addition, communication events were also put forward to the Head, Department of Military Strategic Studies at the United States Air Force Academy (T. Drohan, personal communication, March 4, 2009) and a faculty

member assigned to the Department of Behavioral Sciences (S. Samuels, personal communication, March 4, 2009). Without a doubt, the communication events selected were deemed adequate.

#### *Communication Events Selected*

Sixty-one communication events (N = 61) were selected for Bush and are listed in Appendix C. These include two letters to Congress and 57 speeches, of which two were split and examined as four topic-centric addresses for assessment (N = 61).

Forty-eight communication events (N = 48) were selected for McPeak and are also listed in Appendix C. These include two video briefings, four records of congressional testimony, one magazine article, one press conference transcript, one letter to [President-Elect Clinton], one United States Air Force policy directive, two messages, and a letter sent to an editor. In addition, 33 major speeches are listed, of which one is split into three topic-centric addresses that match three categories (N = 35).

Finally, all 109 communication events selected for Bush and McPeak (N = 109) are listed chronologically in Appendix C. The first speech in the study is the Bush inauguration speech delivered January 20, 1989 (George Bush Presidential Library and Museum - Public Papers). The last in the study is the McPeak farewell address delivered October 25, 1994 (McPeak, 1995).

#### *Lock, Load, and Code*

Following multiple reviews of communication event candidates, and final decision making on the appropriateness of items to be used as samples, this study was locked at 109 communication events (N = 109) attributed to Bush and McPeak. These

selected items were then loaded into content analysis software and coded based on speaker, topic, and communication event delivery date.

### *Preparation for Loading*

Some documents that replicated selected communication events were untidy in standardization and quality, which prompted administrative preparation before loading into content analysis software. For example, scanned images and PDF files were transferred into Microsoft Word documents. This allowed the removal of page numbers, footnotes, subtitles, typographical errors, and other extraneous material that threatened to corrupt the sample during computer analysis.

In addition, some of the documents contained dialog by others that had to be removed. For example, some Bush speeches contained comments or questions by commentators and reporters. McPeak included a number of prompts by commentators and masters of ceremonies. Finally, McPeak included the contemptuous article Metcalf wrote in 1991 (as cited in McPeak, 1995), which prompted the 1992 response that McPeak included. All extraneous material, to include the Metcalf column, was removed.

Consequently, all 109 documents were purified of extraneous material and standardized on individual Microsoft Word documents. In addition, all communication events were checked for standardization and quality multiple times. Finally, spreadsheets were used to manage the list of communication events and variables.

### *Loading and Coding*

Data were then loaded into content analysis software and coded based on speaker, topic, and timing of communication event delivery. All communication events were coded as Bush (0) or McPeak (1), and then categorized as fiscal challenges (0), regional

conflicts (1), organizational changes (2), or other concerns (3). Finally, each communication event was coded from one to 70 based chronologically on the month and year delivered. In the end, the data included 184,654 words or word-phrases, expressed by Bush or McPeak, with 11,972 being unique and useful for analysis.

#### *Transactional and Transformational Recording Units*

The next major step in ascertaining the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language expressed by Bush and McPeak was to select recording units, based on the representativeness of their particular category, from the 11,972 unique candidates. As such, three processes were employed that yielded 220 transactional words and 11 word-phrases that best represent the transactional leadership category. In addition, these processes yielded 192 transformational words and three word-phrases that best represent the transformational leadership category.

#### *Review of the Literature*

Selecting appropriate recording units first began by bolstering knowledge of transformational leadership theory. Specifically, the focus of interest was information put forward by Burns (1978) and the full-range leadership model as championed by Bass (1985) and refined by Bass and Avolio (1994) and Avolio in 1999.

As garnered from these sources, and consolidated by Daft (2005), elements associated with transformational leadership theory include charismatic leadership, *laissez-faire* non-leadership, transactional leadership, and transformational leadership. Factors associated with transactional leadership include contingent reward and management-by-exception, active and passive. Factors associated with transformational

leadership include idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration.

Finally, since management-by-exception is one of two transactional leadership factors and the sixth factor of the full range leadership model (Northouse, 2004), management concepts as found in Daft (2005) and Bennis (2003) were reviewed. Specifically, the management focus of interest was on how staffing, planning, controlling, organizing, and directing (Daft, 2005) are related to transactional leadership.

#### *Appearance System*

A qualitative-based appearance system (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000) was constructed for the categories of transactional and transformational leadership. Attributes, garnered from the review of the literature, were identified and consolidated onto the full range leadership model as championed by Bass (1985) and refined by Bass and Avolio (1994) and Avolio in 1999. As such, this system was employed to help mine and code recording units, while searching through the 11,972 word or word-phrase candidates, which were drawn from the selected communication events.

The attributes, associated with the category of transformational leadership and presented by factor number, in accordance with the full range model, are as follows.

1. Transformational leadership -- Idealized influence: High ethical and moral standards. Can be counted on to do right thing. Includes recording units associated with charisma. Select words or word-phrases normally associated with leaders such as Nelson Mandela (Northouse, 2004).
2. Transformational leadership -- Inspirational motivation: High expectations inspire commitment. Includes recording units associated with symbols and

emotional appeal. Select words or word-phrases normally associated with managers who motivate via encouragement and pep talks (Northouse, 2004).

3. Transformational leadership -- Intellectual stimulation: Reflects creativity, innovation, and challenging of beliefs. Includes recording units associated with critical thinking and problem solving (Breaux, 2009). Select words or word-phrases normally associated with managers who promote based on innovation (Northouse, 2004).
4. Transformational leadership -- Individualized consideration: Manifested by supportive climate, careful listening, and enhanced actualization. Includes recording units associated with coaching, facilitating, and teaching. Select words or word-phrases normally associated with managers who treat workers in caring ways (Northouse, 2004).

The attributes, associated with the category of transactional leadership and presented by factor number, in accordance with the full range model, are as follows.

5. Transactional leadership -- Contingent reward: Efforts exchanged for specified rewards and agreements linked to payoffs. Includes recording units associated with recompense. Select words or word-phrases that would normally be associated with parents and children negotiating television time versus piano practice (Northouse, 2004).
6. Transactional leadership -- Management-by-exception (active and passive): Reflected by criticism enhanced by negative feedback and negative reinforcement. In active form, leader monitors for mistakes or



violations and then corrects. In passive form, leader intervenes after standards not met or problems arise. Includes recording units associated with the management concepts of staffing, planning, controlling, organizing, and directing (Daft, 2005).

7. *Laissez-faire* -- Non-leadership factor: Recording units reflecting *laissez-faire* behavior, which is manifested by the abdication of responsibility, were not considered. Do not select words or word-phrases normally associated with managers who take the approach of “hands-off—let things ride” (Northouse, 2004, p. 179).

#### *Keyword in Context*

Although recording units can be “words or terms, themes, characters, paragraphs, and items” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000, p. 298), almost all of the recording units used in this study are single words (N= 412) with only a handful (N = 14) consisting of word-phrases. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000, p. 298) warn “the recording unit may be a single term, but in order to decide whether the term is treated favorable, the researcher has to consider the entire sentence in which the term appears” (p. 298).

In heeding the warning of Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000), each recording unit candidate was evaluated via a keyword in context analysis. Words and word-phrases that matched as transactional or transformational at first blush, but not so when viewed in the complete context of their delivery, were purged. For example the word force, which suggests a transactional exchange process between a leader and follower, albeit draconian, occurs frequently amid the McPeak speeches. However, upon

investigation using the keyword in context function, the term was not transactional, but instead, reflected the second half of the term Air Force.

### *Expert Review*

Krippendorff in 2004 (as cited in Erickson, 2005, p. 56) “suggested that two people independently review the material for [recording] units.” In turn, the conductor and author of this research accomplished comprehensive reviews both independently and alongside the committee chair. In addition, dissertation committee members reviewed the selected recording units and contributed greatly to the process.

Appropriate recording units were drawn based on an amalgamation of the basic definitions of transactional and transformational leadership concepts as put forward by Burns (1978) and the full-range leadership model as championed by Bass (1985) and refined by Bass and Avolio (1994) and Avolio in 1999. As such, recording units were discussed with other experts in the field of leadership studies, serving as faculty members assigned to the Department of Business and Leadership at Our Lady of the Lake University, even though they were not serving on the dissertation committee.

### *Transactional and Transformational Custom Dictionaries*

Once selected recording units were deemed representative of transactional and transformational leadership concepts, this study was locked at 220 transactional words (N= 220) and 11 word-phrases (N = 11) that best represented the category of transactional leadership. In addition, 192 transformational words (N = 192) and three word-phrases (N = 3) were deemed to best represent the transformational leadership category. These 412 words (N = 412) and 14 word-phrases (N = 14) were subsequently used to populate two custom dictionaries.

Two custom dictionaries were crafted to represent the categories of transactional and transformational leadership language as used in this study. In turn, each of the 412 words ( $N = 412$ ) and 14 word-phrases ( $N = 14$ ), which had been identified as either a transactional or transformational recording unit, was transferred into the appropriate dictionary. Once this transfer was complete, the two dictionaries contained transactional and transformational leadership language that Bush and McPeak expressed while addressing key topics during the period of interest.

#### Data Collection and Analysis

Data collected and analyzed during this study populated the primary dependent variables, supported the categorization of the primary independent variables, and facilitated the study of the secondary independent variable. The level of significance deemed acceptable in this study, for all statistical analyses, was at least 95% certainty.

#### *Dependent Variables*

The 109 communication events ( $N = 109$ ) that were collected, selected, and coded by speaker, topic, and chronologically, were analyzed using the two custom dictionaries. A word frequency count was accomplished on each Bush and McPeak communication event, which provided the number of transactional and transformational recording units that existed in each event.

Numbers of transactional and transformational recording units that existed in each communication event were then compared to total words per event. This provided a ratio of transactional and transformational recording units per words in speech, which allowed for a conversation to percentages.

Finally, the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership recording units per communication event were expanded to the entire sample (N = 109). This provided the total percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language contained in the selected Bush (N = 61) and McPeak (N = 48) communication events, which denotes the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language expressed by Bush and McPeak during the period of interest.

*Primary Independent Variables*

The primary independent variables consist of the speakers, Bush and McPeak, and key topics they discussed while serving in their leadership positions. Data collected and analyzed supported the collective categorization of topics, which were deemed to be fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns. As such, to determine the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language expressed by Bush and McPeak during the period of interest, as a result of speaker and topic, a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was accomplished.

*Secondary Independent Variables*

Data collected and analyzed supported the secondary independent variable, which was crafted to address the suspicion that a significant relationship might exist between the timing of communication event delivery and use of transactional or transformational leadership language. As such, all pertinent communication events for Bush and McPeak were dated, assembled in chronological order, and assigned a chronological rank based wholly on month and year. Relationships were then explored via a Pearson Correlation Coefficient analysis.

### Ethical Considerations

This study was conducted as a content analysis of communication events obtained from the public record. It did not involve human subjects and formal written consent from Bush or McPeak was not required.

## CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS

### Overview

Statistical results, garnered from the methodology associated with this study, support all aspects of this dissertation. Efforts were primarily focused on ascertaining if there is any significant difference in the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language, expressed by President Bush and General McPeak during the genesis of the unipolar moment, as a result of speaker and topic.

Results were also garnered from methodology associated with this study, which supports a secondary issue regarding the timing of communication event delivery and use of transactional or transformational leadership language. Data were collected, measured, and results are put forward.

Finally, statistical results obtained provide empirical contributions to any perceived legacies Bush and McPeak may retain from their unipolar experiences. However, since no qualitative analysis or formal field study was accomplished (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000), no direct outcomes or qualitative results are reported.

### Data Collected

Data collection efforts in this study were centered on ascertaining the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language expressed by Bush and McPeak during the period of interest. To accomplish this task, data were collected to populate the dependent variables. Recording units in the form of word or word-phrases, which best represent transactional or transformational leadership language, were mined from 109-communication events (N = 109).

Total words or word-phrases collected from the 109-communication events resulted in 184,654 recording unit candidates, with 11,972 being unique and useful for potential analysis. From these recording unit candidates, 220 transactional words and 11 word-phrases were selected to best represent the transactional leadership category. In addition, 192 transformational words and three word-phrases were selected to best represent the transformational leadership category.

Data were also collected and analyzed to support the secondary independent variable, which was directly related to any significant relationship between the timing of communication event delivery and use of transactional or transformational leadership language. As such, selected communication events for Bush and McPeak were dated, assembled in chronological order, and assigned a chronological rank based wholly on month and year delivered.

#### *Response Rates*

This study was conducted using content analysis research techniques. As such, all communication events were obtained from the public record and response rates were not applicable or problematic.

#### *Sampling Conducted*

Communication events were selected via a non-probability sample design, using convenience and purposive samples garnered unobtrusively from archival records (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). Samples attributed to Bush were drawn from archives located at the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum in College Station, Texas. Samples for McPeak came from items published by Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. (McPeak, 1995).

The sampling method used in this study included a process to determine if the key topics Bush and McPeak discussed, as contained in communication events sampled, reflect key issues that existed during the period of interest. Samples were also evaluated via comparative studies and expert review.

Sixty-one communication events (N = 61) attributed to Bush were selected for this study. For McPeak, 48-communication events (N = 48) were selected. The total communication events selected for Bush and McPeak equaled 109 (N = 109).

### Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics were used in this study to “summarize, organize, and simplify data” (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2007, p. 6). In addition, statistical analysis was accomplished via a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Pearson Correlation Coefficient. Post hoc pairwise comparisons were accomplished with a Scheffe' test. Finally, the level of significance acceptable in this study was at least 95% certainty with five percent or less doubt ( $p \leq .05$ ).

### *Overview of Findings: The Big Picture*

The primary purpose of this dissertation is to ascertain if there is any significant difference in the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language, expressed by Bush and McPeak during the genesis of the unipolar moment, as a result of speaker and topic. The secondary concern is related to a suspicion that a significant relationship might exist between the timing of communication event delivery and use of transactional or transformational leadership language.

In support of the primary purpose of this dissertation, regarding a significant difference in percentages of transactional leadership language as a result of speaker and



topic, a significant main effect was found for the topic.  $F(3, 102) = 5.601, p = .001$ . A post hoc pairwise comparison showed a significantly higher percentage of transactional leadership language associated with the topic fiscal challenges ( $M = .045$ ) than regional conflicts ( $M = .022$ ), organizational changes ( $M = .033$ ), and other concerns ( $M = .025$ ). The post hoc pairwise comparison also indicated a significantly higher percent of transactional leadership language associated with the topic organizational changes ( $M = .033$ ) than regional conflicts ( $M = 0.22$ ).

For percentages of transformational leadership language as a result of speaker and topic, two significant main effects were found regarding the speaker  $F(1, 102) = 23.154, p = .000$  and topic  $F(3, 102) = 3.036, p = .033$ . A post hoc pairwise comparison showed Bush had a higher mean score ( $M = .036$ ) than McPeak ( $M = .021$ ) in the use of transformational leadership language. The post hoc pairwise comparison also indicated a significantly higher percentage of transactional leadership language associated with the topics organizational changes ( $M = .032$ ) over regional conflicts ( $M = .024$ ) and other concerns ( $M = .020$ ).

The secondary concern addressed in this study is associated with the timing of communication event delivery and the use of transactional and transformational leadership language by Bush and McPeak. As such, only one relationship was found significant. A Pearson Correlation Coefficient suggests the longer Bush remained in office, the more he used transformational leadership language ( $r = .290$ ) significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). No relationships suggesting a change in transactional leadership language by Bush, or changes in either transactional or transformational leadership language for McPeak, were found significant.

*Tables and Figures*

Key to this study was populating the categories, associated with the dependent variables, with appropriate recording units. As such, several processes were used to ensure that word or word-phrase candidates, selected as recording units, best represented transactional or transformational leadership language.

The first step was to determine key topics that existed during the period of study, and then determine if communication events selected for Bush and McPeak, via convenience and purposive sampling, reflected similar topics. Both approaches yielded the topics fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns.

The two topic groups were compared and results are in the following tables.

Table 1 displays the topics deemed representative, the frequency of occurrence in Bush and McPeak communication events, and the percentages.

Table 1

*Topics as Represented in Selected Communication Events*

Topics	Frequency	Percent
Fiscal Challenges	13	11.9%
Regional Conflicts	44	40.4%
Organizational Changes	45	41.3%
Other Concerns	7	6.4%
Total	109	100.0%

Table 2 displays topics represented in the number of selected communication events categorized for Bush (N = 61) and McPeak (N = 48).

Table 2

*Topics as Represented in Number of Selected Communication Events by Leader*

Topics	Bush	McPeak	Total Events
Fiscal Challenges	10	3	13
Regional Conflicts	34	10	44
Organizational Changes	17	28	45
Other Concerns	0	7	7
Total	61	48	109

Table 3 displays topics represented in the percentages of selected communication events categorized for Bush (N = 61) and McPeak (N = 48).

Table 3

*Topics as Represented in Percentages of Selected Communication Events by Leader*

Category	Bush	McPeak
Fiscal Challenges	16.4%	6.3%
Regional Conflicts	55.7%	20.1%
Organizational Changes	27.8%	58.3%
Other Concerns	0.0%	14.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%

Communication events selected for Bush (N = 61) were near-equivalent forums, which included 59 speech events and two letters to Congress. However, the types of communication events (N = 48) attributed to McPeak came from a variety of sources. A description of these sources is included in Table 4.

Table 4

*Types of McPeak Communication Events*

Type of Communication	Frequency	Percent
Speeches	35 (*)	72.9%
Press Conference	1	2.1%
Video Briefings	2	4.2%
Letter to Editor	1	2.1%
Congressional Testimony	4	8.3%
Magazine Article	1	2.1%
Messages	2	4.2%
Policy Directive	1	2.1%
Memo to President-Elect	1	2.1%
Total	48	100.0%

\* *Note.* Thirty-three speeches were included. However, a speech delivered on October 26, 1990 (McPeak, 1995, p. 1) was split into three topic-centric subjects that matched three categories. This resulted in 35 speech-centric communication events.

One hundred and nine communication events (N = 109) were coded and loaded into content analysis-centric software. From 184,654 word or word-phrases, of which 11,972 were unique, 220 transactional leadership words and 11 word-phrases were selected to represent the category of transactional leadership while 192 transformational leadership words and three word-phrases were selected to represent the transformational leadership category.

Figure 1 is a histogram displaying the frequency and percent of transactional leadership language contained in the 61 communication events (N = 61) selected for Bush. The mean is 0.03 with a standard deviation of 0.015.




Figure 1. Percent of transactional leadership language expressed by Bush.

Figure 2 is a histogram displaying the frequency and percent of transformational leadership language contained in 61 communication events (N = 61) selected for Bush. The mean is 0.03 with a standard deviation of 0.012.




Figure 2. Percent of transformational leadership language expressed by Bush.

Similar histograms were constructed for McPeak and his use of transactional and transformational leadership language. However, one sampling issue bears discussion. Specifically, McPeak delivered a 7736 word or word-phrase video briefing in November, 1991. This video was considered for removal, based on an initial concern that it would skew data when compared to other relatively small-volume communication events (S. Samuels, personal communication, March 4, 2009). However based on the richness of the

message, and the fact that appropriate recording units versus magnitude of speeches are germane to the dependent variables, a retention decision was made.

Figure 3 is a histogram displaying the frequency and percent of transactional leadership language contained in 48 communication events (N = 48) selected for McPeak. The mean is 0.03 with a standard deviation of 0.022.




Figure 3. Percent of transactional leadership language expressed by McPeak.

The next histogram constructed for McPeak displays his use of transformational leadership language. However, another sampling issue bears discussion. Specifically, one outlier retains 7% of the transformational leadership language. Although some of this oddity could be attributed to sampling error, the speech was identified and reviewed.

The outlier speech, delivered September 18, 1991, was entitled Organize, Train, and Equip. The speech contained 3262 words or word-phrases and put forward five themes on how to transform the United States Air Force. Upon review, it was clearly a transformational leadership language-centric presentation. In the speech, McPeak even mentions, “The proposals we are making [are] perhaps the most important set of restructure initiatives since the Air Force was established as a separate service” (McPeak, 1995, p. 52).

Figure 4 is a histogram displaying the frequency and percent of transformational leadership language contained in 48 communication events (N = 48) selected for McPeak. The mean is 0.02 with a standard deviation of 0.01.




Figure 4. Percent of transformational leadership language expressed by McPeak.



For the secondary concern, regarding any relationships between communication event delivery dates and the use of transactional and transformational leadership language by Bush and McPeak, one relationship was found significant. A Pearson Correlation Coefficient suggested the longer Bush remained in office, the more he used transformational leadership language ( $r = .290$ ) significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). No other relationships, based on time in office by either leader, were significant.

As indicated in figure 5, the longer Bush served in his four-year leadership position, the more he used transformational leadership language ( $r = .290$ ) ( $p = .05\%$ ).




Figure 5. Percent of transformational leadership language expressed by Bush over time.

No other relationships, based on time in office by either leader, were found to be significant. However, the following three figures provide a visualization of leadership language expressed by both leaders over time.

Figure 6 displays transactional leadership language expressed by Bush, which is not statistically significant, but provides an opportunity to discuss another sampling issue. Specifically, the two distinct spikes around period 25 and 40 appear as an oddity, and while these two spikes could be attributed to sampling error, the timeframes were identified and reviewed.




Figure 6. Percent of transactional leadership language expressed by Bush over time.

Period 25, which displays a spike in transactional leadership language, includes the timeframe of the Gulf War. Period 40, which displays a second spike, reflects speeches on domestic reform issues such as government reform, welfare reform, job training, and trade reform. Also included in this time frame are calming comments Bush expressed during riots in Los Angeles, California.

The next two scatter plots, which are also not statistically significant, put forward transactional and transformational leadership language expressed by McPeak over time.

Figure 7 displays transactional leadership language expressed by McPeak.




Figure 7. Percent of transactional leadership language expressed by McPeak over time.

Figure 8 displays transformational leadership language expressed by McPeak.




Figure 8. Percent of transformational leadership language expressed by McPeak over time.

## Null Hypotheses

Six null hypotheses were analyzed in this study. Three were rejected.

$H_{01}$ : There is no significant difference in percentages of transactional leadership language as a result of speaker and topic: categorized as fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns.

Table 5 provides the results of a two-way ANOVA calculated for transactional leadership language, which includes the following two independent variables: Speaker (Bush and McPeak) and topic (categorized as fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns). A significant main effect was found for the topic.  $F(3, 102) = 5.601, p = .001$ .

Table 5

*Two-Way Analysis of Variance for Transactional Leadership Language*

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	<i>df</i>	Mean Square	<i>F</i>	Sig.
Speaker (S)	.000	1	.000	.393	.532
Topic (T)	.005	3	.002	5.601	.001
S * T	.001	2	.000	1.761	.177
Error	.028	102	.000		

A post hoc pairwise comparison test suggested there is a significantly higher percentage of transactional leadership language associated with the topic fiscal challenges ( $M = .045$ ) than regional conflicts ( $M = .022$ ), organizational changes ( $M = .033$ ), and other concerns ( $M = .025$ ). The post hoc pairwise comparison test also indicated a significantly higher percent of transactional leadership language associated with the topic

organizational changes ( $M = .033$ ) than regional conflicts ( $M = 0.22$ ). The two-way ANOVA calculated for transactional leadership language was significant. Therefore, this study supports the rejection of  $H_{01}$ .

$H_{02}$ : There is no significant difference in percentages of transformational leadership language as a result of speaker and topic: categorized as fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns.

Table 6 provides the results of a two-way ANOVA calculated for transformational leadership language, which included the following two independent variables: Speaker (Bush and McPeak) and topic (categorized as fiscal challenges, regional conflicts, organizational changes, and other concerns). Two significant main effects were found regarding the speaker  $F(1, 102) = 23.154, p = .000$  and topic  $F(3, 102) = 3.036, p = .033$ .

Table 6

*Two-Way Analysis of Variance for Transformational Leadership Language*

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	<i>df</i>	Mean Square	<i>F</i>	Sig.
Speaker (S)	.003	1	.000	23.154	.000
Topic (T)	.001	3	.002	3.036	.033
S * T	1.832	2	9.162	.074	0.928
Error	.028	102	.000		

A post hoc pairwise comparison test suggested there is a significantly higher percentage of transformational leadership language associated with the speaker. Specifically, Bush had a higher mean score ( $M = .036$ ) than McPeak ( $M = .021$ ). The

post hoc pairwise comparison test also indicated a significantly higher percent of transactional leadership words associated with the topic organizational changes ( $M = .032$ ) regional conflicts ( $M = .024$ ) and other concerns ( $M = .020$ ). The two-way ANOVA calculated for transformational leadership language was significant. Therefore, this study supports the rejection of  $H_{02}$ .

$H_{03}$ : There is no significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transactional leadership language by Bush.

The results from a Pearson Correlation Coefficient suggest no statistically significant relationships exist between period, as managed by communication event delivery, and the use of transactional leadership language by Bush. Bush did not increase or decrease his use of transactional leadership language while serving in his leadership position, and as such, this study supports the failure to reject  $H_{03}$ .




Figure 6. Percent of transactional leadership language expressed by Bush over time.

H<sub>04</sub>: There is no significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transformational leadership language by Bush.

A Pearson Correlation Coefficient, for period in office and the use of transformational leadership language by Bush, was accomplished. The results ( $r = .290$ ) were significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). This study supports the rejection of H<sub>04</sub>. The longer Bush remained in office, the more he used transformational leadership language.




Figure 5. Percent of transformational leadership language expressed by Bush over time.

H<sub>05</sub>: There is no significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transactional leadership language by McPeak.

The results from a Pearson Correlation Coefficient suggest no statistically significant relationships exist between period, as managed by communication event delivery, and the use of transactional leadership language by McPeak. McPeak did not

increase or decrease his use of transactional leadership language while serving in his leadership position, and as such, this study supports the failure to reject  $H_0$ .




Figure 7. Percent of transactional leadership language expressed by McPeak over time.

Figure 8 represents the final outcome from the Pearson Correlation Coefficient.




Figure 8. Percent of transformational leadership language expressed by McPeak over time.



As such, no statistically significant relationships exist between period, as managed by communication event delivery, and the use of transformational leadership language by McPeak is indicated. Consequently, this study supports the failure to reject the final null hypothesis:

$H_{06}$ : There is no significant relationship between timing of communication event delivery and use of transformational leadership language by McPeak.

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## CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

### Summary

Conclusions and associated discussions presented reflect outcomes of efforts aimed toward primary and secondary aspects of this dissertation. Ascertaining if there is any significant difference in the percentages of transactional and transformational leadership language, as expressed by President Bush and General McPeak while confronting key topics immediately after the Cold War, was a primary task. Conclusions and discussions associated with the secondary issue, which relate to the timing of communication event delivery and the expression of transactional and transformational leadership language, are also presented.

From literature mined to conclusions and discussions put forward, outcomes attained in this study greatly contribute to the body of knowledge and research associated with leadership studies and the unipolar moment. In fact, Bush and McPeak serve as valuable examples of leaders challenged with slashed budgets, regional conflicts, needs to reorganize, and other tribulations that did not perfectly mirror experiences gained during their decades of leadership preparation. Indeed, these leadership opportunities prompted both proactive and reactive actions, as reflected in communication events, which provide richness in the study of leadership. Finally, this study provides an empirically valid contribution to any legacies Bush and McPeak may retain from the unipolar moment.

### Discussion of Findings

While 12-years apart in age, the paths taken and preparations made by Bush and McPeak on their respective journeys to executive leadership positions had similarities.

For example, both were military pilots inculcated by ideologies associated with external threats, and thus matured in a bipolar world engulfed in a Cold War. Also, both were driven to voluntarily seek higher levels of responsibility, and as such, achieved momentous goals commensurate with their choice of careers. Finally, both served in national security leadership positions during the genesis of the unipolar moment.

However, and despite their similarities, outcomes from this study reflect significant differences in their use of transactional and transformational leadership language. In addition, a significant relationship associated with leadership language expressed over time was identified. Consequently, four statistically significant findings in this study warrant discussion. Three involve the primary focus while one involves the secondary effort.

#### *Transactional Leadership Language and Topic*

First, a significant difference in percentages of transactional leadership language expressed as a result of speaker and topic was observed in this study. Specifically, a significant main effect was found for the topic.  $F(3, 102) = 5.601, p = .001$ . Moreover, a post hoc pairwise comparison showed a significantly higher percentage of transactional leadership language associated with the topic fiscal challenges ( $M = .045$ ) than regional conflicts ( $M = .022$ ), organizational changes ( $M = .033$ ), and other concerns ( $M = .025$ ).

This finding is not remarkable. In fact, Bass (1985, p. 14) champions that a “transactional leader pursues a cost-benefit, economic exchange to meet subordinates’ current material and psychic needs in return for ‘contracted’ services rendered by the subordinate.” Consequently, and clearly in the area of resource management, Bush and

McPeak took initiatives “in making contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of valued things” (Burns, 1978, p. 19).

*Bush, Transactional Leadership Language, and Fiscal Challenges*

Without a doubt, prolific expressions of transactional leadership language by Bush, in conjunction with fiscal challenges, is not unexpected. Bush retained a degree in economics from Yale, sported a business background, and performed solidly while managing large and fiscally-centric organizations (Naftali, 2007). Multiple vignettes put forward by Parmet (1997), which range from the establishment of Zapata Petroleum to heading the fiscally-centric Republican National Committee, suggest that Bush mastered the art of making contact and exchanging valued things (Burns, 1978).

*McPeak, Transactional Leadership Language, and Fiscal Challenges*

It is also not unexpected that McPeak embraced transactional leadership language when confronting fiscal challenges. Like Bush, McPeak retained a degree in economics and managed large organizations with robust manpower and budgets (Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak). Moreover, the nature of piloting supersonic aircraft suggests a propensity toward numbers, precision, and near-immediate exchanges of valued things such as time, effort, fuel, and altitude. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to expect that McPeak attempted to influence behavior, via contingent rewards or management-by-exception, while addressing fiscal challenges.

*Transformational Leadership Language and Topic*

Second, statistically significant differences in percentages of transformational leadership language as a result of speaker and topic were also observed in this study. Specifically, a significant main effect was found for the topic.  $F(3, 102) = 3.036, p =$

.033. A post hoc pairwise comparison indicated a significantly higher percentage of transformational leadership language associated with the topic organizational changes ( $M = .032$ ) than regional conflicts ( $M = .024$ ) and other concerns ( $M = .020$ ).

This finding is also not remarkable. Unlike transactional leadership and exchange-based relationships, Bass (1985, p. 15) puts forward that a “transformational leader can move those influenced to transcend their own self-interest for the good of the group, organization, or country.” In the area of organizational changes, Bush and McPeak most favored transformational over transactional leadership language as they argued for change believed to be “right or good” versus what was “popular or acceptable according to the established wisdom of the time” (p. 17).

#### *Transformational Leadership Language and Speaker*

The third statistically significant finding in this study that warrants discussion involves transformational leadership language as a result of speaker and topic. Specifically, a significant main effect regarding the speaker was found.  $F(1, 102) = 23.154, p = .000$ . Particularly important is that Bush had a higher mean score ( $M = .036$ ) than McPeak ( $M = .021$ ) in the use of transformational leadership language.

This finding is not remarkable but it is complex. Paige in 1977 (as cited by Bass, 1985) presents three patterns of political leadership and their effects. These include minimal (conservative), moderate (reformist), and maximal (revolutionary) change. Paige suggests that leaders can straightforwardly accomplish minimal or conservative change via transactional leadership styles, but maximal or revolutionary change involving “fundamental transformation of existing institutions and policies” (p. 19) may be pursued via persuasive or coercive means.

In reviewing these two options for maximal or revolutionary change, Bass (1985) suggests that persuasion is best accomplished by transformational leaders who motivate people to do more than originally expected. In so doing, these leaders embrace idealized influence, inspirational motivation, individualized consideration, and intellectual stimulation.

Regarding motivation by way of coercion, which Johnson (2009) criticizes as unethical, Bass (1985) disapprovingly puts forward:

Transformational political leaders may also use their authority and power to radically reshape through coercive means the social and physical environment, thus destroying the old way of life and making way for a new one. Physical and social patterns and symbols of the old regime are prohibited; new physical and social forms are required (p. 18).

*Bush and Transformational Leadership Language*

This study did not measure coercive-like language, or identify any evidence of unethically-centric coercion, expressed by Bush. However, prolific expressions of transformational leadership language ( $M = .036$ ), as the unipolar moment pressed him to quickly consider and market organizational changes in domestic and international arenas, was identified and not unexpected. In fact, his selection of transformational leadership language complemented his background and political savvy. From inspirational comments written in 1942 regarding combat duty in World War II (Bush, 1999) to his ability to perform “the trick of the political chameleon” (Naftali, 2007, p. 39), Bush clearly favored persuasion over coercion via transformational leadership language.

In addition, political necessity prompted Bush to hone his skills in employing transformational leadership language. For example, Bush retained little positional power over other nations as the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and certainly none over the Chinese while serving in Beijing. Moreover Bush, as an outsider, was tasked to inspire and transform a beleaguered Central Intelligence Agency that was “out of control [and] fighting for its very existence” (Parmet, 1997, p. 184). Finally, Bush as president sought to raise the motivation and morality (Burns, 1978) of the domestic and international community via inspirational visions such as a “new world order” (Naftali, 2007, p. 110) and “a thousand points of light” (Parmet, 1997, p. 361).

*McPeak and Transformational Leadership Language*

This study also did not identify any evidence of unethically-centric coercion expressed by McPeak. Moreover, and prompted by the unipolar moment to generate change, McPeak utilized some transformational leadership language ( $M = .021$ ). However, and not unexpected, his tendency over Bush to select transactional instead of transformational leadership language is empirically evident and resulted in an asymmetric comparison. As such, this asymmetry may have been driven by background, political savvy, and an absence of political necessity.

Regarding background and political savvy, and quite dissimilar from Bush, McPeak was not born into privilege or inculcated early as a son of a United States senator (Bush, 1999). Moreover, approaches toward military service, attitudes regarding the flying of combat aircraft, business acumen, and political sensitivities were also unlike those embraced by Bush. In sharp contrast to a Bush-like political chameleon (Naftali,

2007, p. 39), Powell (1995) describes McPeak as a “lean-as-leather fighter pilot [and] hip shooter prone to fire off ten ideas in one burst, of which three might be good” (p. 478).

McPeak was also less hampered than Bush by political necessity, which in turn may have prompted transactional over transformational leadership behaviors. Although not ideal, this dynamic is not wholly unexpected when political versus military roles are reviewed. Indeed, while Bush had to awe the public for votes and indulge mentors for political advancement, McPeak enjoyed immense positional power as a senior military officer. Consequently, McPeak was politically unconstrained, as illustrated by Hopper (1997), while transacting rapid change via his blunt communication style, failure to build consensus, impeding open communications, and unwillingness to accept input from others. As Watson captured in an end of tour interview, as cited in Hopper (1997), McPeak put forward:

In order to get things changed, you have to know what it is you want done, and then you have to work those things, and the details of those things, and then you have to rework them, and then you have to circle back to rework them again, and then you have to follow up and make sure they heard you the first three times (p. 26).

#### *Leadership Language over Time*

The fourth and final statistically significant finding in this study that warrants discussion involves the secondary concern. Specifically, only one relationship was found significant regarding the timing of communication event delivery and use of transactional and transformational leadership language by Bush and McPeak. As such, this finding suggests the longer Bush remained in office, the more he used transformational



leadership language ( $r = .290$ ) ( $p \leq 0.05$ ). No other relationships, based on time in office by either leader, were significant.

Bass and Avolio (2004) do not advocate selecting one leadership style over the other. In fact, Bass (1985) puts forward that “while conceptually distinct, transformational and transactional leadership are likely to be displayed by the same individuals in different amounts of intensities” (p. 26). Finally, a faculty member employed by the Department of Behavioral Sciences at the United States Air Force Academy suggests that transactional leaders do not stop being transactional as they mature, but instead add a transformational leadership option to their set of choices (S. Samuels, personal communication, March 4, 2009).

Consequently, this finding is remarkable in light of the aptitude for success displayed by both Bush and McPeak on their journeys to top leadership positions. It is also remarkable in the context of Bush failing his bid for reelection, and the tumultuous McPeak tenure ending somewhat despondently. As such, it is reasonable to expect that Bush and McPeak independently, or as prompted by staff members and speechwriters, would have dramatically adjusted their use of leadership language to leverage strengths and opportunities while diminishing weaknesses and threats (Parnell, 2008).

#### *Bush and Leadership Language over Time*

Bush did not significantly alter his use of transactional leadership language during his time in office. However, an upward adjustment of transformational leadership language is both empirically evident and historically documented. Indeed, Bush and Scowcroft (1998) provide specific examples in which transactional leadership language, contained in proposed remarks, was replaced with transformational leadership words.

Retaining processes, by which Bush and his team researched and crafted speeches so as to maximize effectiveness, via the bolstering of transformational leadership language, is not unexpected. However, the failure of these processes to craft transactional leadership language toward the end of his first term, in an effort to restore confidence in economic issues, is peculiar. Quizzically Bush, the businessman and millionaire with a degree in economics from Yale, was stymied in part by an inability to bolster public confidence via an exchange-dialogue on fiscally-centric topics.

#### *McPeak and Leadership Language over Time*

No adjustment of leadership language by McPeak, as time in office passed and challenges mounted, was found statistically significant. In addition, no documentation was found in the literature that suggests McPeak pursued a language adjustment so as to bolster influence and mitigate agitation. As Hopper (1997) put forward, “Leadership style and blunt communication methods hurt [McPeak] in getting lasting changes implemented [and] caused scar tissue on [McPeak] and the Air Force” (p. 41).

Stalwartness by senior military officers charged to lead change is refreshing and not unexpected. However, the failure of McPeak to address and mitigate a progressive firestorm of criticisms and inefficiencies, via an adjustment of leadership language, remains peculiar from a leadership perspective. Indeed, the United States Air Force, as well as McPeak himself, would have benefited more had he leveraged his communication talents better, while championing for change, as his time in office progressed.

#### Limitation of Findings

Unlike experimental designs, such as those frequently used in biology or physics, this study was conducted as a non-probability sample design using convenience and

purposive samples garnered unobtrusively via archival records (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). As such, this study of property-disposition relationships versus stimulus-response relationships garnered opportunities for imprecision and error.

In response to this scientific untidiness, a number of research actions inherent in social science, such as the employment of specialized data analysis techniques, were used to abate negative impacts. However, even though precautionary procedures were abided by and significant results obtained, it remains important to call attention to eight known limitations of this study.

First, while there was a time period in which Bush and McPeak served in their respective leadership positions and communicated concurrently, the overlap is not exact. The Bush presidency began with an inaugural address on January 20, 1989 (Parmet, 1997), while McPeak assumed his chief of staff position and delivered his first speech on October 26, 1990 (McPeak, 1995). Moreover, Bush left office in January, 1993 with final remarks delivered on December 15, 1992 (George Bush Presidential Library and Museum - Public Papers). However, McPeak continued serving until delivering retirement remarks on October 25, 1994 (McPeak, 1995).

These solo before-and-after periods produce limitations. Specifically, any propensity for transactional or transformational leadership language expressed by McPeak before joining Bush in October, 1990 is not captured and cannot be compared to leadership language delivered by Bush from January, 1989 to September, 1990. The same limitation exists for transactional or transformational leadership language delivered by McPeak after Bush left office in January, 1993.

Second, and related to the time dilemma, is the problem of experimental mortality. Regarding this issue, Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000, p. 96) put forward that “dropout problems prevent the researcher from obtaining complete information on all cases.” Indeed, the absence of McPeak during the first 21-months of the Bush presidency produced a reverse-experimental mortality problem, while the 21-months McPeak served after Bush dropped out from the study mirrors a classic experimental mortality dilemma.

Third, historical events that occurred during the time of the study, in which Bush and McPeak served absent each other, might have produced a transactional or transformational-centric response from the missing leader. For example, no McPeak leadership language is available regarding the historical overthrow of Noriega in December, 1989 (Bush, 1999), just as leadership language from Bush is absent from debates in 1993 regarding homosexuals serving openly in the military (McPeak, 1995).

Fourth, data on transactional and transformational leadership language expressed by Bush were limited by the number and type of communication events deemed representative and valid for leadership style assessment. From Duesterberg (2001):

President Bush made fewer speeches than did other modern presidents. Speeches were tabulated for Franklin D. Roosevelt through William Clinton. President Bush was the least prolific in public speeches. He communicated to the public mainly through presidential news conferences and his press secretary (p. 6).

The communication events McPeak made available and selected for assessment is the basis of the fifth limitation under which this study was conducted. Specifically, in

Kelly's forward to *Selected Works: 1990-1994* (as cited in McPeak, 2005, p. xvii), he mentions that McPeak published 48-pieces of communication that included "speeches, congressional testimony, a press conference transcript, a letter to [president-elect Clinton], two magazine articles, an Air Force policy directive, and a letter sent to an editor." This kaleidoscope of McPeak communication events limits standardization with those selected for Bush, in which 59 of 61 were major speeches.

A sixth limitation under which this study was conducted involves verbal, nonverbal, intended, and unintended messages that may not be cleanly captured in a quantitative study, but clearly populate the literature and contribute to legacies. For example, Jowett and O'Donnell (1999, p. 7) surmise 1991 Gulf War propaganda while pointing out that "Bush consistently mispronounced Saddam with the accent on the first syllable – SADam." In addition, McPeak ended two video briefings designed to educate the masses on organizational changes with the operations-centric comment "see you on the flight line" (McPeak, 1995, p. 113, p. 172). These insensitive quasi-valedictions enhanced a perceived "second-class citizen syndrome" (Hopper, 1997, p. 30) among people serving in the United States Air Force, since the majority at that time worked nowhere near aircraft. Moreover, it validated concerns by Donald B. Rice, the Secretary of the Air Force at the time, over McPeak's favoritism to pilots. (p. 30). As such, legacy-centric literature suggests these messages were apparent to the masses and media, but were not picked up as unusual during content analysis processes.

Dueterberg (2001) matures this limitation beyond a mismatch between spoken words and blurred meanings, and here as a seventh limitation, suggests speeches delivered by Bush "did not necessarily reflect the actual leader behavior" (p. 6). This

study was conducted under the same limitation for Bush. In the case of McPeak, memorable distracting behaviors, which were absent from the collection of communication events he provided in *Selected Works: 1990-1994*, fueled a legacy the quantitatively-based study did not detect.

An eighth and final limitation involves levels of analysis. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) describe levels of analysis, via the replicate term “units of analysis, [as] the most elementary part of what is to be studied” (p. 47). Deciding upon a level of analysis to study, and then adjusting the research procedure to accommodate that level, prevents misuse of operational definitions and misleading generalizations. To illustrate, the operational definition of survival is quite different in a study of individuals versus nations (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).

Consequently, the limitation that only one United States president, and only one chief of staff of the United States Air Force, can occupy these one-deep positions at a time precludes a relationship study between direct peers, such as two presidents or two chiefs of staffs, during the identical period of interest. To mitigate a potential for error associated with mismanagement of levels of analysis, Bush the president and McPeak the general were regarded as members of one national security leader-centric categoric group (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).

In summary, this study was conducted under the following eight limitations.

1. The overlap between Bush and McPeak is not exact. Bush occupied the office of the presidency 21-months before McPeak. McPeak served in his chief of staff position 21-months after Bush retired from public service.
2. Misaligned overlap issues may prompt experimental mortality limitations.

3. Misaligned overlap issues may prompt experimental history limitations.
4. Bush tended to communicate via news conferences and his press secretary so language assessed was limited to communication events judged to be valid for study.
5. Language assessed for McPeak was limited to an assortment of communication items he made available to the public.
6. Nonverbal gestures and subtle messages were not identified or highlighted as unique during the content analysis process.
7. Words spoken did not always match behavior.
8. Levels of analysis limitations require Bush and McPeak to be regarded as members of one national security leader-centric categoric group.

#### Recommendations for Further Research

First, it would be valuable to repeat this study with another measurement device. Rubenzer and Faschingbauer (2004) explored the personality, character, and leadership of United States presidents using, among several other tools, the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R). The version Rubenzer and Faschingbauer used was “designed to be completed by a family member, friend, or acquaintance – or anyone who knows the person well” (p. 5). Consequently, this study could be replicated with a focus on the Big Five personality traits of Bush and McPeak by having experts on these leaders complete this inventory.

Second, and from a unipolar moment perspective, it would be valuable to emulate this study with a focus on top unipolar leaders, who served alongside McPeak, from the United States Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Specifically, researchers

interested in a particular branch of the United States military could conduct a study of Bush and a respective service counterpart, such as the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, or Chief of Naval Operations, who served at the conclusion of the Cold War. This study would certainly be rich, as evidenced by the October 24, 1994 front page article in the *Washington Post*, as cited by McPeak (1995):

Air Force Chief on Attack: McPeak Boldly Criticizes Other Services' Roles and Plans: Army, Navy, and Marine Corps leaders are fuming over a blunt and unusually public campaign by the Air Force's chief of staff to limit the functions performed by the other military services (p. 335).

Third, and also from a unipolar perspective, it would be valuable to conduct a similar study of foreign leaders, either within NATO or the Warsaw Pact, who served during the genesis of the unipolar moment. For example, researchers interested in British studies could analyze communication events documenting Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her military leaders. In addition, researchers interested in Russian studies, and with suitable access to former-Soviet archival records, could analyze communication events documenting Secretary General Gorbachev and his military leaders during the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Fourth, since the unipolar moment had domestic as well as international implications, it would be valuable to conduct a study of key state leaders. For example, Texas Governor Ann Richards, a Democrat and critic of Bush, served during the genesis of the unipolar moment (Richards & Knobler, 1989). In addition, Florida Governor Robert "Bob" Martinez, a Republican and subsequent "Drug Czar" for Bush, also served during this tumultuous period (Museum of Florida History). An examination of their



communication events related to national security and the unipolar moment, amid the perspective of differing political viewpoints, would certainly be rich.

Finally, researchers with an interest in other historical events could emulate processes used in this study based on a time and place of choice. For example, researchers interested in British studies and haunting operations in World War I could analyze communication events by Prime Minister H. H. Asquith and Sir Winston Churchill, who served as the First Lord of the Admiralty, which were expressed before, during, and after the disastrous 1915 Gallipoli Campaign (Cohen & Gooch, 1990). Regarding the slaughtered British, Australian, New Zealand, and French troops in this campaign, and the applicability to leadership studies, Cohen and Gooch put forward:

[Troops] were inadequately led and poorly commanded, and in these circumstances the innate characteristics of the troops were magnified by the shortcomings of the military organization and the weaknesses of the system ... The people at the front line certainly fail, but – contrary to what initial impressions often suggest – the more important failures occur in the rear (p. 163).

#### Application to Practicing Leaders and the Scholarly Knowledge Base

Much detail associated with the path and preparations Bush and McPeak took on their treks to executive leadership reflect concepts retained by the academic disciplines of security and strategic studies, history, and political science. However, in the context of this study, these experiences were first and foremost two journeys of leadership. Consequently, and supported by an interdisciplinary approach, this study provides

contributions to practicing leaders while bolstering the scholarly knowledge base in five distinct ways.

First, background information on the genesis of the unipolar moment, coupled with the pragmatic proposition that unipolar-centric ignorance is unacceptable, bolsters the need for this study. Practicing leaders charged to perpetuate or voluntarily abandon United States unipolar resilience must champion positions based on research versus rhetoric. Moreover, while there is much unipolar-centric literature in other disciplines, there is regrettably a void in the discussion of this phenomenon in leadership literature. This study services both these needs with an empirical contribution.

Second, the comprehensive discussion on leadership theory champions the position that leadership is indeed an academic discipline that warrants focused practice and robust research. The literature is sometimes untidy regarding leadership theories, and consequently, the use of a taxonomy and nomenclature, as put forward by Van Seter and Field (1990), provides convenient categories to populate. As such, this populated contribution educates practicing leaders on new ways of thinking that develop after a realization that existing paradigms become inadequate. In addition, this contribution focuses researchers on opportunities to continue bolstering the scholarly knowledge base.

Third, the comprehensive presentation on transformational leadership theory, which transitions the focus from the historical view provided by Van Seter and Field (1990), to current understandings and efforts, is indeed contributory. Practicing leaders, and researchers charged to bolster the scholarly knowledge base, would be remiss if ignorant of ongoing efforts in this field, as spawned by Burns (1978) and the full-range leadership model as championed by Bass (1985), and then refined by Bass and Avolio

(1994) and Avolio in 1999. In concert, the inclusion of the meta-analysis by Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, and van Engen (2003) provides valuable insight into a kaleidoscope of research on transactional, transformational, and *laissez-faire* leadership.

Fourth, the tailored biographies on Bush and McPeak are presented in a way that augments discussions on leadership theory. For researchers charged to bolster the scholarly knowledge base, personalities presented match potential trait theory research while the inclusion of situations may be used to bolster research associated with behavior being contingent on situations. Regarding the benefit of biographies to practicing leaders, General Steven R. Lorenz (2008) puts forward:

I have dedicated myself to learning from other people's experiences so that I do not waste time trying to reinvent the wheel. Studying and learning how other leaders overcame adversity will build confidence in one's own ability to make tough decisions (p. 7).

Fifth and finally, the empirically valid contribution to any legacies Bush and McPeak may retain from the unipolar moment is most notable. Indeed, reasonable people may disagree on Bush and McPeak legacies. However quantitative outcomes from this study, when added to subjective views, generate more constructive lessons of leadership.

For example, the tendency of McPeak to select more transactional than transformational leadership language than Bush is empirically evident and resulted in an asymmetric comparison. Moreover, it is also empirically evident that McPeak did not adjust either transactional or transformational leadership language as his time in office progressed. Finally, Bush did not increase his use of transactional leadership language as

economic concerns mounted. These are not debatable or subjective assertions, but instead empirical outcomes of this study.

As practicing leaders select behaviors, they may emulate the characteristics of a “political chameleon” (Naftali, 2007, p. 39) like Bush or charge forward as a “lean-as-leather fighter pilot [and] hip shooter” (Powell, 1995, p. 478) like McPeak. Moreover, these leaders may select Bush-behaviors, such as being “the ‘nice man’ around the White House” (Parmet, 1997, p. 263), or like McPeak, embrace a politically unconstrained atmosphere that sanctions blunt communications (Hopper, 1997). Consequently, and based on choices and subsequent outcomes, personal leadership legacies will develop.

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APPENDIX A

TRANSACTIONAL WORDS AND WORD PHRASES

Able	Authorities	Claimed
Accomplish	Authority	Collapse
Accomplished	Authorization	Collapsed
Accomplishing	Authorize	Compromise
Accomplishment	Authorized	Conform
Accomplishments	Award	Consistency
Achieve	Awarded	Consistent
Agreement	Awards	Consistently
Agreements	Bargain	Control
Aim	Bestowed	Controlling
Allocate	Bid	Coordinate
Allocated	Bidders	Correct
Allocating	Bidding	Corrected
Allocation	Break	Costs
Arrange	Budget	Customary
Arranged	Budgets	Deal
Arrangement	Business	Dealing
Arrangements	Businesses	Defend
Assign	Cause	Defending
Assignment	Claim	Defense

Defenses	Goal	Monitor
Demand	Goals	Monitored
Destruction	Governing	Monitoring
Destructive	Governmental	Objective
Direct	Governments	Objectives
Directed	Government	Offer
Directing	Impact	Offered
Directive	Income	Offering
Duty	Induce	Operational
Economic	Legal	Operational- Requirements
Economical	Make	Operationally
Economically	Manage	Operations
Economics	Manageable	Order
Economies	Management	Ordered
Economy	Managerial	Ordering
Establish	Managers	Orders
Established	Manages	Organization
Establishes	Managing	Organization-Air
Establishing	Mandate	Organizations-Away
Exact	Mandated	Organization-For
Federal	Mandates	Organizations-Simplicity
Fit	Mandating	Organizational
Fitness	Manipulate	Organizationally

Organizations	Quality	Responds
Organize	Recommend	Response
Organized	Recommended	Responses
Organizes	Recommends	Responsibilities
Organizing	Recruit	Responsibility
Perform	Recruiting	Responsible
Performance	Reduce	Reward
Performed	Reduced	Rewarding
Performs	Reduction	Rewards
Personnel	Regulate	Selection
Plan	Regulated	Shape
Policies	Regulation	Shaped
Policy	Regulations	Spend
Policy-Making	Regulators	Spending
Power	Reporting	Spends
Powerful	Require	Spent
Powers	Required	Staff
Practical	Requirement	Staffing
Present	Requirements	Staffs
Presented	Requires	Standards
Pressure	Resources	Stop
Procedures	Respond	Stopped
Produce	Responded	Strength

Strengthen	Task	Trained
Strengthened	Task-Equipping	Training
Strengths	Task-Training	Transfer
Strong	Tasks-Flying	Undertake
Structure	Tax	Undertaking
Submit	Taxes	Valuable
Suggest	Tell	Work
Suggested	Top-Management	Worked
Suggestions	Total-Quality	Worker
Tactical	TQM	Workers
Tactics	Train	Working

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APPENDIX B

TRANSFORMATIONAL WORDS AND WORD PHRASES

Affections	Bond	Creating
Aid	Care	Creative
Anticipate	Caring	Creatively
Anticipated	Challenge	Creativity
Aspirations	Challenging	Dedication
Assist	Chance	Desire
Assistance	Character	Desired
Attachment	Comfort	Despair
Avoid	Comfortable	Devote
Avoided	Comforting	Devoted
Avoiding	Commitment	Devotion
Belief	Commitments	Dream
Beliefs	Communities	Dreamed
Beliefs-Our	Community	Dreams
Believe	Consideration	Empowerment
Benefit	Craft	Encourage
Benefits	Crafted	Encouraged
Better	Create	Encouragement
Bipartisan	Created	Encourages
Bipartisanship	Creates	Encouraging

Enthusiastically	Given	Initiating
Equality	Great	Innovation
Ethics	Generate	Innovations
Exemplified	Health	Innovative
Expect	Help	Innovators
Expectation	Helped	Inspiration
Expectations	Helpful	Inspiration-The
Expected	Hinder	Inspire
Expecting	Hope	Inspired
Facilitate	Hopeful	Inspires
Facilitates	Hopefully	Inspiring
Faith	Hopefulness	Intellectual
Faithful	Idealistic	Invent
Faithfully	Improve	Invented
Families	Improved	Inventing
Family	Improves	Investment
Feeling	Individual	Investments
Feelings	Individuals	Justice
Future	Influence	Kindness
Generated	Influenced	Meaning
Generating	Initiate	Meaningful
Give	Initiated	Moral

Morale	Problem-Solving	Security
Morality	Programs	Spirit
Morally	Program	Stimulate
Morals	Proposal	Support
Motivated	Proposals	Supportable
Motivating	Propose	Supported
Motivation	Proposed	Supporters
Motives	Proposing	Supporting
Motivated	Provide	Supportive
Need	Provided	Teach
Neediest	Provider	Teacher
Needs	Providers	Teachers
Opportunities	Provides	Teaches
Opportunity	Purpose	Teams
Optimism	Reason	Teamwork
Optimistic	Reasonable	Thoughtful
Peace	Refrain	Together
Peaceful	Relationship	Trust
Peacefully	Relationships	Unfair
People	Relief	Vision
Prevent	Relieve	Visionary
Prevented	Relieved	Visions
Preventive	Saves	Wishes

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## APPENDIX C

## EVENTS BY SPEAKER, TOPIC, DATE OF DELIVERY, AND MONTH OF STUDY

Event	Speaker	Topic	Date	Month of Study
1	Bush-01	Organizational Changes	1989-01-20	1
2	Bush-02	Organizational Changes	1989-02-09	2
3	Bush-03	Organizational Changes	1989-04-30	4
4	Bush-04	Organizational Changes	1989-11-22	11
5	Bush-05	Regional Conflicts	1989-12-20	12
6	Bush-06	Organizational Changes	1990-01-31	13
7	Bush-07	Regional Conflicts	1990-08-08	20
8	Bush-08	Regional Conflicts	1990-08-29	20
9	Bush-09	Regional Conflicts	1990-09-11	21
10	Bush-10	Fiscal Challenges	1990-09-11	21
11	Bush-11	Fiscal Challenges	1990-09-16	21
12	Bush-12	Regional Conflicts	1990-10-01	22
13	Bush-13	Fiscal Challenges	1990-10-02	22
14	McPeak-01	Regional Conflicts	1990-10-26	22
15	McPeak-02	Other Concerns	1990-10-26	22
16	McPeak-03	Organizational Changes	1990-10-26	22
17	Bush-14	Regional Conflicts	1990-11-16	23
18	Bush-15	Regional Conflicts	1990-11-16	23
19	Bush-16	Regional Conflicts	1990-11-17	23
20	Bush-17	Regional Conflicts	1991-01-05	25

Event	Speaker	Topic	Date	Month of Study
21	Bush-18	Regional Conflicts	1991-01-16	25
22	Bush-19	Fiscal Challenges	1991-01-29	25
23	Bush-20	Regional Conflicts	1991-01-29	25
24	McPeak-4	Organizational Changes	1991-01-31	25
25	Bush-21	Regional Conflicts	1991-02-01	26
26	Bush-22	Regional Conflicts	1991-02-01	26
27	Bush-23	Regional Conflicts	1991-02-01	26
28	Bush-24	Regional Conflicts	1991-02-02	26
29	Bush-25	Regional Conflicts	1991-02-23	26
30	Bush-26	Regional Conflicts	1991-02-26	26
31	Bush-27	Regional Conflicts	1991-02-27	26
32	Bush-28	Regional Conflicts	1991-03-02	27
33	Bush-29	Regional Conflicts	1991-03-06	27
34	McPeak-5	Regional Conflicts	1991-03-15	27
35	Bush-30	Regional Conflicts	1991-03-22	27
36	Bush-31	Organizational Changes	1991-04-18	28
37	Bush-32	Regional Conflicts	1991-06-01	30
38	Bush-33	Organizational Changes	1991-06-22	30
39	Bush-34	Organizational Changes	1991-09-06	33
40	Bush-35	Organizational Changes	1991-09-13	33
41	McPeak-06	Organizational Changes	1991-09-18	33
42	Bush-36	Organizational Changes	1991-09-23	33

Event	Speaker	Topic	Date	Month of Study
43	Bush-37	Regional Conflicts	1991-09-27	33
44	Bush-38	Organizational Changes	1991-09-28	33
45	McPeak-07	Organizational Changes	1991-10-24	34
46	McPeak-08	Organizational Changes	1991-11-nd	35
47	Bush-39	Regional Conflicts	1991-11-09	35
48	Bush-40	Regional Conflicts	1991-12-23	36
49	Bush-41	Regional Conflicts	1991-12-25	36
50	Bush-42	Fiscal Challenges	1991-12-27	36
51	McPeak-09	Organizational Changes	1992-01-nd	37
52	Bush-43	Fiscal Challenges	1992-01-28	37
53	McPeak-10	Organizational Changes	1992-01-30	37
54	McPeak-11	Organizational Changes	1992-02-20	38
55	McPeak-12	Regional Conflicts	1992-02-21	38
56	Bush-44	Organizational Changes	1992-03-28	39
57	Bush-45	Fiscal Challenges	1992-04-04	40
58	Bush-46	Fiscal Challenges	1992-04-11	40
59	Bush-47	Organizational Changes	1992-04-18	40
60	Bush-48	Fiscal Challenges	1992-04-25	40
61	McPeak-13	Regional Conflicts	1992-04-29	40
62	McPeak-14	Organizational Changes	1992-05-nd	41
63	Bush-49	Regional Conflicts	1992-05-01	41

Event	Speaker	Topic	Date	Month of Study
64	Bush-50	Regional Conflicts	1992-05-09	41
65	Bush-51	Regional Conflicts	1992-05-25	41
66	McPeak-15	Organizational Changes	1992-06-01	42
67	McPeak-16	Organizational Changes	1992-06-01	42
68	McPeak-17	Organizational Changes	1992-06-01	42
69	Bush-52	Fiscal Challenges	1992-06-06	42
70	Bush-53	Fiscal Challenges	1992-06-10	42
71	McPeak-18	Regional Conflicts	1992-06-19	42
72	Bush-54	Organizational Changes	1992-06-27	42
73	McPeak-19	Organizational Changes	1992-07-01	43
74	McPeak-20	Fiscal Challenges	1992-07-nd	43
75	Bush-55	Regional Conflicts	1992-07-21	43
76	McPeak-21	Other Concerns	1992-07-30	43
77	Bush-56	Regional Conflicts	1992-09-01	45
78	Bush-57	Organizational Changes	1992-09-12	45
79	McPeak-22	Organizational Changes	1992-09-16	45
80	Bush-58	Regional Conflicts	1992-09-21	45
81	Bush-59	Organizational Changes	1992-11-07	47
82	McPeak-23	Regional Conflicts	1992-11-23	47
83	Bush-60	Regional Conflicts	1992-12-04	48
84	Bush-61	Organizational Changes	1992-12-15	48

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Event	Speaker	Topic	Date	Month of Study
85	McPeak-24	Organizational Changes	1992-12-21	48
86	McPeak-25	Organizational Changes	1993-02-05	50
87	McPeak-26	Other Concerns	1993-03-24	51
88	McPeak-27	Organizational Changes	1993-03-30	51
89	McPeak-28	Regional Conflicts	1993-04-15	52
90	McPeak-29	Organizational Changes	1993-04-27	52
91	McPeak-30	Regional Conflicts	1993-06-07	54
92	McPeak-31	Organizational Changes	1993-06-12	54
93	McPeak-32	Other Concerns	1993-07-21	55
94	McPeak-33	Other Concerns	1993-08-13	56
95	McPeak-34	Organizational Changes	1993-09-09	57
96	McPeak-35	Organizational Changes	1993-09-15	57
97	McPeak-36	Organizational Changes	1993-10-21	58
98	McPeak-37	Fiscal Challenges	1993-10-28	58
99	McPeak-38	Regional Conflicts	1993-12-17	60
100	McPeak-39	Organizational Changes	1994-01-05	61
101	McPeak-40	Organizational Changes	1994-01-10	61
102	McPeak-41	Regional Conflicts	1994-02-18	62
103	McPeak-42	Organizational Changes	1994-07-15	67
104	McPeak-43	Organizational Changes	1994-08-20	68
105	McPeak-44	Organizational Changes	1994-09-14	69
106	McPeak-45	Fiscal Challenges	1994-09-16	69



Event	Speaker	Topic	Date	Month of Study
107	McPeak-46	Organizational Changes	1994-10-17	70
108	McPeak-47	Other Concerns	1994-10-24	70
109	McPeak-48	Other Concerns	1994-10-25	70

APPENDIX D: LEGAL REVIEW



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
AIR EDUCATION AND TRAINING COMMAND

OCT 15 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR AETC/SE

FROM: HQ AETC/JA

SUBJECT: Legal Review of Dissertation

1. You requested a legal review of your dissertation, prepared as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Leadership Studies. You directed our attention to pages i-vi of your dissertation. We find no legal objection to the material in the specified pages, contingent upon the approval of the agencies identified below.

2. DoD 5500.7-R, *Joint Ethics Regulation (JER)* Section 3-307b requires all writings that pertain to military matters, national security issues, or subjects of significant concern to the Department of Defense (DoD) be reviewed for clearance by appropriate security and public affairs offices prior to delivery or publication. In addition, DoD Directive 5230.9, *Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release*, paragraph 4b, reiterates this guidance, while AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Policies and Procedures*, Chapter 15, provides the procedures for obtaining the security and policy reviews.

3. With regard to your specific concerns, we provide the following:

a. The JER permits the use of your rank and branch of service in personal endeavors (JER Section 3-300). You may also include biographical information and data concerning your duty history. However, use of your military rank and inclusion of your title or position as part of a biographical history, in conjunction with DoD-related subject matter, requires use of a disclaimer (JER Section 3-307a). Pursuant to JER Section 3-307a(1), the required disclaimer must expressly state that the views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the DoD or its components. In addition, the disclaimer must be printed in a reasonably prominent position in the writing itself (JER Section 3-307a(2)). Your disclaimer is sufficient in that it contains language that substantially complies with JER Section 3-307, is located on the second page of the dissertation (immediately following the title page), and uses the same font and size as the remainder of the text in the document.


b. Copyright is a form of protection for original works of authorship and covers both published and unpublished works. Copyright exists from the moment the work is created. Since the dissertation was drafted in your personal capacity, off-duty, and without the use of government resources, there are no copyright issues with respect to the government.

c. Absent objections from the aforementioned agencies, there are no legal issues with regard to your discussion of your meeting with former President Bush, attendance of a lecture by General McPeak at Air War College, or use of sources available to the public.

d. Air University will be able to provide guidance regarding the possibility of making a donation to the McPeak collection.

4. Since you are not receiving compensation for publishing the writing, the rules at 5 CFR 2635.807(a) regarding teaching, speaking, and writing are not applicable.

5. As drafted, your dissertation raises no legal issues. Please let me know whether you have any questions or would like to discuss this matter further.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "David C. Wesley". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

DAVID C. WESLEY, Colonel, USAF  
Staff Judge Advocate

APPENDIX E: SECURITY AND POLICY REVIEW



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
AIR EDUCATION AND TRAINING COMMAND

9 November 2009


MEMORANDUM FOR AETC/SE

FROM: HQ AETC/PAO

SUBJECT: Request for Security and Policy Review PAO 09-10-01

We have reviewed the attached dissertation titled: "President George H.W. Bush and General Merrill A. McPeak: an Investigation of the Differences Between Two National Security Leaders, Vis-à-vis Leadership Styles, As Expressed During the Genesis of the Unipolar Moment" in accordance with AFI 35-101, para 15.1. Our recommendation is as follows:

- No Objection
- No Objection, subject to amendments for security and policy as indicated.
- Recommend additional review by: \_\_\_\_\_
- Objection. Amendments to permit publication are impractical. Reasons are stated below.

  
DAVID E. SMITH, YS-02, DAFC  
Chief, PA Operations Division

Attachment  
Dissertation